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INTRODUCTION
The growth of the academic literature of military
strategy has been one of the major intellectual phenomena
of the cold war era in the United States,,

The literature

has had a twofold effect on the various social science
disciplines.,

The first effect is quantitative: a great

amount of work is being done on problems that were once
almost completely outside the ken of social scientists.,
The change is so striking that the incoming head of the
American Political Science Association in 1961 was led to
predict that national security analysis would become one
of the important fffieldsn in political science and in the
social sciences generally;^ this prediction has long since
come true.,
Second, there is a qualitative effect: social
science appears to have finally become a key element at the
high levels of policy-making, as the following quotations
indicate:
Collectively, (Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter,
Henry Kissinger and Thomas Sehelling) are the van
guard and foremost representatives of a new element
in the counsels of American Government: the Aca
demic Strategisto
% e w York Times„ Sept.,
1

1961, p„ 25„

2

The two principal sources of this new theory are
the simulated situations of the traditional "war
games" and the transposition of the mathematical
theory of games into military-political matching
of wits and threats involved in deterrence theory*
. . . As a result, the traditional military strate
gists have been replaced by a new breed of men » * *
Herman Kahn, Thomas B* Schelling, Henry Kissinger,
Donald Brennan, Oskar Morgenstern, Albert Wohlstetter, Glenn H* Snyder*
Whatever the explanation, academics have moved
into the military policy field, and have brought
with them a degree of sophistication and intellec
tual rigor never before s e e n * 2
The inspiration for this inquiry was, initially, a
feeling of strangeness induced by a lengthy study of the
literature on national security policy*

Almost all of

the works one encountered in this field seemed vested with
a tremendously authoritative air, an air that one normally
associated with scholarly work in the most well-established
and systematically researched disciplines,

Yet, clearly,

the study of security policy, particularly nuclear deter
rence policy, was not in any meaningful sense a discipline;
and somehow, all this authority produced policy proposals
2Joseph Kraft, "The War Thinkers," Esquire, LVIII
(Sept* 1962), p* 103=
(for a similar comment by a social
scientist who has written extensively in the national
security area, see G* Lyons, "The Growth of National Secur
ity Research," Journal of Politics, XXV (Aug* 1963)? 4^950$); M* Lerner, The Age of Overkill (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1 9 6 2 ), p* 27; and J* B* Singer, "Arras Control and
Beyond: a review of T* C* Schelling and Morton H* Halperin,
Strategy and Arms Control; and D* Frisch, "Arms Reduction;
Program and Issues," Journal of Conflict Resolution, V
(Sept* 1961), 311c
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that one felt absolutely no urge to agree with®

Some were

at best questionable? e<>go, the assertion that there was
a delicate balance of terror at a time when one could per
ceive no visible reason to feel delicately balanced..
Others seemed absurd? e»g,, the casual assumption that the
rational response to a nuclear strike on one’s cities is
a counterstrike on the attacker’s cities„

Still others

seemed absurd given one’s own preconceptions? such as the
development of complicated contingency plans requiring
more and different levels of nuclear and conventional arma
ments, plans that seemed designed to further accelerate an
already dangerous arms race®

Finally, one did not know

what to make of the assertion that nuclear war could be
survived and was therefore ’’thinkable” when it was so ob
viously (in Herman Kahn's odd locution) "unthinkable
The most frightening thing is that these intellec
tually elaborate theories were not merely proposed as
guidelines, but were in fact implemented as security
policy®-^

It is amazing to note the cool, detached way in

^The "delicate balance" strategy was used to guide
the Eisenhower security policy., "Counterforce" was a term
used to describe the security policy of the early Kennedy
yearsc
"Spectrum deterrence" policy developed from a modi
fied counterforce strategy and was used during the last
years of the Kennedy administration., The term also aptly
describes the policy in existence today® Spectrum deter
rence strategy dictates that a country develop military
power at all levels, from guerrilla warfare to general
nuclear war, required to deter any aggressive activities by
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which Secretary of Defense McNamara explained his policy of
pure counterforce--direct retaliation against Russia's
arsenal in case of attack--in July of 1962 and then a month
later proposed that American policy was a "modified counterforee"--direct retaliation against Russian cities--because
the Soviets had "hardened" their missile s i t e s D e f e n s e
Secretary McNamara changed his policy as easily and with
the same lack of remorse as Thomas Schelling would change
his strategy in a "non-zero-sum game0n^
the enemy0 For chronological descriptions of national
security policy, see G 0 H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense?
Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, M,J,t
Princeton University Press, 1961); and S„ P. Huntington,
The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Poli
tics (New York;
Columbia University Press, 196l)« National
security policy in the Kennedy^-Johnson era is discussed in
Ho Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York? Anchor,
1 9 6 5 }.' and Go Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston?
Little,
Brown and C o 0, 19057°
^ S e e Robert Si McNamara, address before the Fellows
of the American Bar Foundation Dinner, Chicago, July 17,
1962, Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs News
Release #23$, pp.. 6-7; and New York Times. Aug. 2, 1962,
p 0 13° Go Lowe comments on the change in counterforce
strategy in The Age of Deterrence, op0 cite, p« 239o

5l am referring here to the mathematical games
Schelling plays in his Strategy of Conflict (New York?
Oxford University Press, 1963)4. A further example of this
lack of remorse is found in certain statements by Herman
Kahn, when he talks about the aftermath of nuclear war?
"Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective
studies indicate that even though the amount of human
tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the
increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the
majority of survivors and their descendentso"

5

It occurred to me that this inculcation of academic
theory into the real world of national policy-making might
have a substantial effect on the whole foreign policy situ
ation.

What follows is an attempt to explain this effect;

to demonstrate that present national security policy can
only have a deleterious effect on the attainment of stated
,fnon-security” policy.

Such a study is especially needed

because of the peculiar way in which the academic theorist
and the foreign policy-making elite have become insensitive
to the working realities of their strategy,^
^"Security” policy is distinguished from ”nonsecurity" policy in Chapter I of this study,

7lt is of significant note that I blame both the
intellectual and the policy-maker for this state of affairs.
The policy-maker has accepted the theories presented by the
scholar without regard to their practical utility. This
condition has probably come about due to our society5s
great respect for the claims of science and expertise.
Indeed, it has not been the exception that the academic
theorist has been given the authority to make American
policy.
John Bennett takes an interesting turn on this
point. In his article ’’Moral Urgencies in the Nuclear Con
text,” he submits that the academic community adds to the
complex of power which Eisenhower mentioned. He illustrates
his position with references to the link between RAND Cor
poration's think tank and the Air Force on the one hand and
with the universities on the other. Bennett warns that
there is a danger we shall confront one vast establishment
which includes business, the military, the civilian govern
ment , the scientific community, foundations and the univer
sities and that those who are most competent to criticize
the policies of government concerned with national defense
will be inhibited by their responsibilities in relation to
these policies. For further reference see John C. Bennett,
”Moral Urgencies in the Nuclear Context,” in John C. Bennett
(ed°), Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience
(New York? Scribner, 1962), pp.
112ff,
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Scope
It is apprepriate at this point to state some pre
sumptions which seem most likely to influence my analysis
of national security policy*

The reader is urged to bear

in mind that these are, for the sake of analysis, only
asserted presumptions*

I shall not attempt to defend them,

but only present them so the reader may understand the
scope of this paper*
To attempt an analysis of foreign policy requires
a framework in which the interplay of different pressures
can be observed and recorded*

The research design used

here is based on a simple proposition? the concept of a
system is no less valid in foreign policy analysis than in
the study of domestic politics*^

Like all systems of

action, the foreign policy system comprises an environment
or setting, a group of actors, and structures through which
they initiate decisions*

The latter two components of the

system are discussed later*

The operational environment

contemplated in this study is essentially bilateral in
^It is not particularly relevant to this study to
explain the components and workings of a systems design in
international relations*
It is to be conceded that the
theoretical content of studies in foreign policy is wholly
inadequate*
However, the scope of this paper is so narrow
as to preclude the use of an elaborate design as a research
aid*
The reader is referred to a design presented in
M* Brecher, B* Steinberg and J* Stein, "A Framework for
Research on Foreign Policy Behavior,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, XIII (March 1969), 75-102*
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nature*

A bilateral system refers to the total pattern of

interactions between two superpowers; at present, this re
fers to relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union*

The pattern creates an image of intensive competi

tion and interaction in the diplomatic, economic and scien
tific fields, with a different sort of competition in the
military field*

It will be recalled that the basic motive

for this study is to uncover the effects of national
security policy on the foreign policy arena itself*

Such

a study involves a focus upon the policy of both super
powers *9
Hypothesis
Chapter I of this study is devoted to a descrip
tion of United States and Soviet national security policy*
The discussion in Chapter II has a twofold purpose*

First,

9since the primary focus of the study is on the
Soviet-American confrontation, there are certain related but
distinct questions which it does not attempt to deal with at
length* Specifically, other advanced countries, particularly
those in Europe, have an important role to play in the in
ternational system* However, from the point of view of this
study, the contribution of Europe to the system is viewed as
a distinct problem worthy of being dealt with in its own
right* See, for example, Henry Kissinger, The Troubled
Partnership* op * cit*; and Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver1*s
Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (Hew
York? McGraw Hill, 1968]* Similarly,while the accommodation of Soviet-American competition in the developing areas
is discussed, a full-scale treatment of the role of these
areas in the evolving world system is not attempted* For
a brilliant development of this point, see John G* Stoessinger. The Might of Nations {New Yorks Random House,
1962}, especially chapters 4 and 5°

g
the "non-security” foreign policy objectives of both coun
tries are presented and compared for divergence and com
patibility o

Second, these objectives are viewed in the

light of national security objectives to demonstrate the
following hypothesis;
Implementation of security objectives in the
United States and the Soviet Union tends to
frustrate the attainment of nonsecurity objec
tives by both countrieso
Time Span Covered
The period chosen for study was January 20, 1961»
to January 20, 1969o

There was a consistent political

philosophy moving American executive policy-making during
this periodo

Moreover, there was little significant turn

over in the top echelon of the executive department during
the Kennedy-Johnson administrations„

There was, of course,

a more substantial break in the governing elite of the
Soviet Union during the period„

However, the ideological

motives determinative of Soviet policy remained relatively
10
constant for both the Khrushchev and Breshnev regimes„

^ A n entire meeting of the Academy of Political
Science was devoted to discussions of trends in the Soviet
Union after Khrushchev*, See S a Diamond (ed„), "The Soviet
Union Since Khrushchev--New Trends and Old Problems," Pro
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVIII
1 April 19h5), the entire issue0
~~~
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Methods and Sources Employed in the Study
The problem of establishing, with a high amount of
accuracy, foreign policy objectives for the United States
and the Soviet Union is basic to this study*

The method

chosen for this study is one which focuses upon what may
be called "elite articulation*"

There is only one pre

sumption involved in this method: foreign policy objectives
are what the foreign policy elite say they are*
focus implies certain limitations*

11

Such a

First it raises the

problem of properly identifying the foreign policy-making
elite*

Stated generally, the decision-making elite con

sists of those individuals who perform the function of
political authorization in the foreign policy arena*
Political authorization may be defined as authorization
sanctioned by the conventions of the system*

This core

group usually consists of the head of government, his
department and his foreign minister; its size and composi
tion will vary with the issue*

The scope, nevertheless,

will of necessity be narrow here: many may influence deci
sions but only those who articulate them will be considered*
In the United States, of course, the Chief Executive is
charged with the conduct of foreign relations by law*

The

For a lengthy discussion of these limitations and
the use of "elite articulation" in foreign policy analysis,
see S* Hoffman, Contemporary Theories in International
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N*J*s
Prentice Hall” 1 9 6 0 ),
especially pp* 171ff°
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President and his Secretaries of State and Defense are the
American elites,,

In the Soviet Union, the top echelon of

the Soviet foreign policy-making apparatus is fused in the
leaders of the Party Politburoo^2
The second limitation arises when one attempts to
determine whether the articulations, expressions of opinion
and statements of policy are particularly reliable indices
of actual goalso

One may infer them from actual behavior,

or one may infer them from what the actors say about them,
but in each case he is compelled to rely upon the intelli
gent i n f e r e n c e F u r t h e r m o r e ,

it is generally true that

an individual is never fully aware of the forces that make
for his own behavior, even though he may be aware of these
forces in the behavior of others„

Finally, there is the

problem of dissimulation in any of its myriad aspects„

An

elite may articulate in order to generate an image, persuade
an audience, demonstrate solidarity, plead a case or merely
blow off steam,,

Despite these pitfalls, however, freedom

of speech is enough of a reality in the United States for
one to accept that elite articulations do represent the
^2por further discussion of this point and for a
listing of the high level members of the Politburo, see
J 0 F 0 Triska and D 0 Do Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy
(New York? MacMillan & C o 0 , 1968):-, pp» 75ff°

13perhaps the best discussion of the problem of
inference is in A, L 0 George, Propaganda Analysis?
A Study
of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II
TEvanst o n ,~I117? Pet erson7' How,~ 1959) > especially chapter 4°
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opinions of those people for whom they purport to speak0 '
There is also justification for conceiving that enough free
play has developed in the Soviet Union since Stalin's
death for elite differences of value to come to light in

''j

Soviet statements,,
The third problem is encountered when one attempts
to identify those written materials that would most faith
fully reflect the assumptions, expectations and policy of
the elite0

After considerable research, I selected for

the United States?

Public Papers of the President— Kennedy

anci Johnson „ a governmental publication of the speeches and
news conferences of the President; the Department of Defense
Bulletin and the Department of State Bulletin,, the weekly
official organs of the executive agencies most deeply in
volved in foreign policy; the New York Times„ a privately
published daily newspaper, most widely confided in and read
by the governmental decision-making elite; and Foreign
Affairs, a quarterly journal privately published by the
1hCouncil of Foreign Relations in New York0
And for the USSR, I selected?

Pravda, a daily news

paper published in Moscow, organ of the Central Committee
^ O t h e r American sources of limited value were Con
gressional Committee Reports and Hearings; The Congressional
Record; Documents on American Foreign Relations (annual); ~
and The Congressional Quarterly Almanac■»
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of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Kommunist,
a monthly journal published in Moscow, the theoretical
spokesman for the Central Committee, both of these papers
as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies
in New York; and International Affairs, a monthly journal
published in Moscow in several languages „ ^
The most difficult methodological step of all was
working out a set of distinctions among the various foreign
policy goals,,

I have attempted to justify my distinctions

in the first chapter,,

In Chapter I, the goals of national

security are presented in order that objectives of a
decidedly "non-security" nature would come to light.,

Thus

I have formulated two categories of foreign policy objec
tives „

The first category is termed "security” and includes

those objectives which are patently concerned with national
security,,

The second category contemplates those objectives

which are, when taken at face value, "nonsecurity” oriented„
The second category is broken down into five sub-categories:
foreign trade; foreign aid, participation in international
organizations; space research; and cultural interchange,,
It is recognized that the second category of foreign policy
M o t h e r Soviet sources of some help were Decisions
of the Congress of the CPSU; Military Thought; and various
articles from Red Star and Soviet Union as printed in
The Current Digest„
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»
objectives may have latent security underpinnings, but for
purposes of discussion they can be distinguished from this
underlying motive<>
A comment about the validity of my research design
might be made at this point.

It must be admitted that the

method of research used in this study was somewhat selec
tive,

However, as it turned out, there were few surprises

in the comparison of Soviet-American foreign policy objec
tives o

My results show close correspondence with indepen

dent, more systematic and quantitative analyses by American
scholarso

For this reason, it is submitted that one may

regard the method as a valid one.

CHAPTER I

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND
ITS OBJECTIVES
If self-preservation is the first law of nature,
it is also the first law of foreign policy,.

Safeguarding

the security of the nation is the foremost obligation of
the statesman according to Nicholas J„ Spykmans
Because territory is an inherent part of a state,
self-preservation means defending its control over
territory; and because independence is of the
essence of the state, self-preservation also means
fighting for independent status„ This explains
why the basic objective of the foreign policy of
all states is the preservation of territorial
integrity and political independence„1
Admittedly, this basic goal is seldom stated so
badly0

For instance, Secretary of State Dean Acheson

phrased it this ways

,TTo build our strength so that the

things we believe in can survive is the practical and
vitally necessary expression in times of moral dedication*,"
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that "The
broad goal of our foreign policy is to enable the people
1Nicholas J„ Spykman, Americans Strategy in World
Politics (New Yorks
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1942), p „ 17°
^Dean G„ Acheson,."The Shield of Faith," Department
of State Bulletin, XXIII (November 20, 1950), S00o
1A

2
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of the United States to enjoy, in peace, the blessings of
liberty*”3

President John F 0 Kennedy believed that

America’s basic goal was to "seek a peaceful world community
of free and independent states, free to choose their own
future and their own system so long as it does not threaten
the freedom of others*”^

However articulated, it is the

same goal? preservation of the national security of the
nation, which is a basic premise underlying the attainment^
of other foreign policy objectives,,
Few concepts are at once so fundamental, and yet
so elusive, as this one*

In common with many other ideas

that must be dealt with in the study of foreign affairs, it
is a relative concept„

Its meaning for individual nations

will be determined by numerous variables; history, geography,
cultural traditions, strategy and tactics

in war, the

nature of the economic system, and public opinion, to men
tion but a few of the influences*

Nations may be, and fre

quently have been, mistaken in their estimates of what
constitutes security»

Hitler, no doubt, believed that

attacking Poland, France, and later Russia would promote
German security,,

His miscalculations had disastrous

3John Foster Dulles, "Our Foreign Policies in Asia,”
Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (Feb* 2$, 1955)» 327°
^•John F 0 Kennedy as quoted in Dean Rusk, "America’s
Goal--A Community of Free Nations,” Department of State
Bulletin, XLVI (March 1962), 449°
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consequences for the German nation,.
Security is one of those elastic terms like "due
process" or democracy,,

Almost every nation is in favor of

it in the abstract, both for itself and generally for other
nations,.

But nations disagree violently over what it means

in concrete circumstances*

So great may be the different

conceptions of it that security for one country can mean
disaster for another,,

For the Kremlin, security might, and

possibly does, mean nothing less than a communized world,
directed from Moscow*

For the United States it conceivably

entails the eventual extinction of communism as a militant
ideology*

Such examples suggest that attempts to achieve

security can lead to a strange paradox? while security is
i

the underlying foreign policy objective of every nation,
concrete efforts to achieve it are productive of endless
insecurity throughout the international community as a
whole*^
Still another attribute of the security concept
requires emphasis*
never static*

A nation’s conception of security is

It changes over the years*

The explosion

of the first atomic bomb by the Russians in 194-9» for
instance, revolutionized official American thinking about
^This paradox is closely linked to the present
hypothesis and is more fully discqssed in the conclusion*
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national security„

By 1957s another major change in

American ideas about security was necessitated by the suc
cess of the Soviet Union in launching Sputnik by means of
a giant long-range missile,,

Security* then* is closely

linked with technological progress„

New inventions like

the aircraft carrier* long-range bombers and missile-armed
submarines contributed to the security of the United States„
The reader need be cautioned that preservation of
national security is by no means the only basic goal of
statecraft,,

William P 0 Gerberding suggests that there are

two fundamental goals of foreign policy,,?

Gerberding sub

mits that the central concept in international politics is
’’the national i n t e r e s t I t

is generally accepted that

any government pursues foreign policies that it believes
will be in its nation’s best interest„

As used by Gerber

ding* "national interest” means the security and well-being
of the nation and its citizens„

Whatever protects or

^It has been suggested that Russian development of
nuclear weapons as a means to security policy was prompted
by American nuclear superiority as demonstrated at Hiroshima«
For a discussion of this kind of "self-fulfilling prophesy*”
see Samuel P„ Huntington* The Common Defense* o p „ cit „ *
chapter 6„
?William P„ Gerberding* United States Foreign Policvs Perspectives and Analvsis TNew York?" McGraw Hill„
i9fe)7 P : 9 :
........... —
% o r another conception of "the national interest*”
see Hans Morgenthau* In Defense of the National Interest
(New York? Random House* 1951~) <> ^Morgenthau pleads for an
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promotes these conditions is said to be "in the national
interest 0"
In this paper, "security" means physical safety,
territorial integrity, and political independence,,
being" is much more difficult to define,,

"Well-

It surely has an

economic dimension, but it is much more than thato

The

well-being of a citizenry requires the preservation of its
cultures and values, of its way of lifeD
The well-being of a nation is sought for its own
sake; it is not a means to another end„

The United States

presumably desires and would be willing to assist in the
creation of a free, prosperous Europe or Latin America even
if such a condition were not so clearly desirable from the
standpoint of American security„

Similarly, the Soviet

leaders may actually believe it intrinsically desirable for
Eastern Europeans and Asians to live under an independent
regime even if the Soviet Union had.no stake in it«
If one examines the history of American postwar
foreign relations, he may note several categories of policy
American foreign policy which shall follow "but one guiding
light--The National I n t e r e s t W h i l e he is not explicit in
regard to the meaning he attaches to the symbol "national
interest," it becomes clear that the author is thinking in
terms of the national security interest, and specifically
of security based on power„ Morgenthau?s concepts cannot
be effectively used here, because I am not able to conclude
that national interest and national security are synonymous
termso
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objectives which have, at face value, a nonsecurity motive„
Both the Democratic and Republican parties have supported
reciprocal trade with other countries,

Technical assistance

to underdeveloped countries has also received bipartisan
supporto

So have economic aid, the United Nations, dis

armament, political independence df colonial peoples,
peaceful development of space resdarch and cultural inter
change.

These goals have formed important elements in

American foreign policy since 1945»

For analytical pur

poses, objectives ih the foregoing categories are assumed
to be pursued for their own sake.

When a nation proposes

that it intends to promote the economic development of a
new State, it will be presumed that there is no intrinsic
security motive.
It is conceded that a difficulty inheres in the sug
gested distinction between those Objectives that are de
sired for their own sakes and those that are instrumental
in character *

In the realm of values, one man's set of

priorities may bear little or no relationship to the next
man's.

As intimated above, the objective of preserving a

free Western Europe is purely a defensive expedient to some
Americans, whereas for others it constitutes an extrinsically important objective, which should be pursued at great
cost simply for its own sake, regardless of the bearing on
national security,.

However, these distinctiorls are useful

for present purposes and will recur throughout the paper.
For some policies the relationship to national
security is much more direct.

Among the patent security

objectives are provision of military arsenals, extension
of military assistance to other countries, maintenance of
strong military alliances, control of markets involving
strategic goods, and development of an effective intelli
gence network.

These objectives directly enhance the

nation’s security.
In summary, there are two basic goals of foreign!
policy? to enhance the security of the nation and to pro- \
vide for the well-being of its citizenry.

The first goal I

‘involves defense policy--the development of a country’s

]

military potential--and the attempt to influence the actipns
of other countries, whether by organizing them in efforts
of collective defense or by creating an environment which
is favorable to that country.

The second fundamental goal

includes those objectives the pursuance of which bears no
obvious relation to national security.

In the period with

which this paper is concerned, the following objectives
could be included? reciprocal trade; economic aid to under
developed countries; participation in international organi
zations; space research; and cultural interchange.
It is helpful at this point to take a closer look
at the realities of the first goal--national security.

No
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lengthy documentation is needed to prove that the policies
of the United States toward Soviet Russia in the present
decade have been more concerned with security objectives
than have its policies toward Canada and India»

Russia

poses a perceived threat to the United States; Canada and
India do not.

The United States will naturally be less

motivated by security considerations in dealing with its
friends than with its avowed diplomatic enemies„

Let us

then compare the security objectives of the United States
and the Soviet Unionc
American National Security Objectives
There are six specific objectives of UoS» security
policy..

The first objective of U» S 0 policy is to find a

peaceful basis for relationship with the Soviet Union and the
rest of the world„

Every American leader since World War II

has stated this as the prime objective of security policy.,
As the world begins to change and as grandiose military solu
tions become mutually ruled out, the goal of the United
States is to develop a modus vivendi„ a more agreeable way
to live with the Soviet Union in the same world0
Objective number two is the prevention of all wars.
If this goal is not attained clearly all other goals—
including "winning over eommunism!,--become relatively
meaninglesso

The anticipated cost of a large- or small-

scale nuclear war, as every modern president of the
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United States has realized, makes this goal one of pre
eminence *,
Objective number three is closely related to the
first two.

This goal has been exhaustively discussed in

and out of government*,

Let us use a kind of shorthand

here and say that the objective calls for the maintenance
of an "adequate” level of military posture that deters
aggression*^

The effect of this objective is that mili

tary preparedness, quite apart from specific crises, has a
10
tendency to escalate„

Moreover, the continuous change

in military technology creates a continuing apprehension
that any temporary balance may be upset by future develop
ments*,

Research must be pursued on a very broad plane to

preclude the possibility that the opponent will score an
unmatchable breakthrough in a weapons system,,

The best

protection is normally judged to be to move to production
oneself,,

11
The fourth goal of American security policy is to

9For a detailed discussion of this objective, see
Lyndon B„ Johnson, "A Special Message to Congress," Congres
sional Record, XXXVI (Jan„ 1S, 1965)s 1-2*,
^^Morgenthau, Singer and Phillip Green scathingly
criticize maintenance of a spectrum military posture on
this pointo
^ T h e proponents of a new anti-ballistic missile
system constantly argue that the Soviets have developed a
"new" warhead capable of carrying several nuclear devices
and that the United States must move to production a new
ABM system to counteract the Soviet breakthrough,,
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master the arms race; to moderate it, preferably to reverse
it, and to create new arrangements for military security
which conform to the new realities of our age."^

In his

first State of the Union message a few days after his
inauguration, President Kennedy announced!
I have already taken steps to co-ordinate and expand
our disarmament effort— to increase our programs of
research and study--and to make arms control a cen
tral goal of our national security policy under my
directiono The deadly arms race, and the huge re
sources it absorbs have too long overshadowed all
else we must do. We must prevent that arms race
from spreading to new nations, to new powers with
nuclear capability and to the reaches of outer
space3
This means a wide variety of arms control measures and con
trol of the environment so that "Nth” countries will not
acquire the ability to provoke war or entangle the super
powers „
The fifth vital American interest is in winning the
battle against communism in the developing societies.

There

seems to be a popular belief among present-day American
elites that communism must be halted in the emerging nations
if the United States is to protect herself from a communist
takeover.

In his first major defense statement, President

f^This objective seems wholly inconsistent with the
previous objective.
13John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message,
January 30, 1961, Public Papers of the President--J. F. Kennedy, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.? U.S. Government Printing
Office", 1 9 6 4 ), 'p. 3 7 °
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Kennedy had this to say about communist "wars of libera
tion" in the emerging societies:
The free world’s security can be endangered not only
by a nuclear attack, but also by being slowly
nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our
strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltra
tion and intimidation, indirect or nonovert aggres
sion, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, or
a series of limited warsc
In this area of lbcal wars, we must inevitably
count on the co-operative efforts of other peoples
and nations who share our concern. Indeed, their
interests are more often directly engaged in such
conflictso
The self-reliant are also those whom it
is easiest to help--and for these reasons we must
continue and reshape the military assistance
program o . . 0H
The last sentence of the presidential statement suggests an
interaction of objective number five and objective number
three.

Countries threatened by a communist regime should

be given military aid with which to maintain a posture
against such an incident.

Secretary McNamara was more ex

plicit :
To deal with the Communists (in the developing
areas) requires some shift in our security think
ing. We have been used to developing big weapons
and mounting large forces. Here we must work with
companies and squads, and individual soldiers,
rather than battle groups and divisions. In all
four services we are training fighters who can, in
turn, teach the people of free nations how to fight
for their freedom. At the same time our strategic
weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated,
we must learn to simplify our tactical weapons,
1^-The President of the United States, Recommenda
tions Relating to Our Defense Budget (Washington, B.C.?
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), House Document
# 1 2 3 , pp. 1-2.

25

so that they can be used and maintained by men
who have never seen a machine more complicated
than a well sweep 5
The last national security objective of the United
States is to be first in space; to assure that these
regions will not be used as touchstones for aggressive
attacks on the United States»

Be securing positions of

dominance in space, American elites hope to pre-empt its
use for military purposes by another power0
is closely intertwined with the first three<>

This objective
An insight

into UoS„ security policy in space can perhaps best be ob
tained from Robert S. McNamara’s reply to congressional
committee questioning early in 1963"
I think there is no clear requirement for military
purposes for United States operations in space as
we look at the future today. However, whether
there will be a military requirement in the future,
I don’t know. But should one develop, it could
come so quickly in a field in which the lead time
for developmental technology is so long that I be
lieve we must anticipate that possibility today
by carrying out certain of the development work
associated with putting a man in space for mili
tary purposes0l6
T5Robert S D McNamara, Address to American Bar
Association, July 17, 1962, op0 eit. , p B 6 0
"f^U.So, House of Representatives, Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appro
priations for 1964, Hearings, 88th Congress7 1st Sess«
Part 3 (Washington, D 0C 0; U«S. Government Printing Office,
1963), p° 335° A representative sample of documents and
writings on American national security policy may be found
in Do M 0 Abshire and R„ ¥ 0 Allen, National Security
(New York? Praeger, 19 6 3 ) 0
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Soviet National Security Objectives
In the last fifteen years there has grown up a
considerable new body of Soviet strategic thought on the
employment of security p o w e r ?

One of the striking as

pects of recent strategic studies is the close attention
that has been devoted to U.S. security thinkings

It

should not, therefore, be surprising that there exist many
parallels in Soviet and American security policy.
Morgenstern, for examples, has pointed out:

Oskar

uIn their

approach to many (security) issues, entire pages could,
by substituting the words Soviet Union and the United
States for each other, be used for describing the American
situation."^

U.S. security objectives, as we have seen,

1?One °f the most outstanding explications on
Soviet security policy and military strategy is presented
by Vo I. Sokolovsky (ed0), Military Strategy (U.S.SoR.,
1962)o Two U 0S 0 translations have been published commer
cially: (1 ) Herbert S. Dinerstein, Soviet Military Strategy
(New York? RAND, Prentice-Hall, 19 6 3 ); (2) Raymond L »
Garthoff, Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts
(New York:- Praeger, 1963)= Page references to the Sokolovsky study refer to the Prentice-Hall edition,,
^ O s k a r Morgenstern as quoted in Robert D„ Crane
(edo), Soviet Nuclear Strategy, A Critical Appraisal
(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University, 1963), p 0 44» Many argue that
Soviet security policy is implemented in reaction to Ameri
can objectives and vice versa 0 This condition of actionreaction has a tendency to reaffirm the original policy,
thereby reinforcing hostile suspicions. It is suggested
that this condition will continue until the two countries
reach a level of hostility that verges on the brink of
violence.
The result is a fabricated predicament of dan
gerous porportions and effects.
This type of argument is
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might be summarized as peace, the deterrence of all wars,
the defeat of aggression* peaceful solutions to conflict
and disarmamento

Similarly* Soviet objectives speak of

preserving and strengthening peace and developing the
world socialist system* of deterring world war* of curbing
imperialist aggression* of peaceful coexistence and of
1Q
general and complete disarmament» 7
The key to the real differences in Soviet and
UoSo objectives is revealed by the underlined words„

Thus

the Soviets are interested in peace to the extent that at
any particular time it may seem the best situation within
which to promote the development of communism0

"Peaceful

coexistence*" said N„ S 0 Khrushchev* "must be correctly
understoodo

Co-existence is a continuation of the conflict

between two social systems, but by peaceful means, without
war o o . for the triumph of communism throughout the
world 0" ^
quite eonvincingo For further reference, see note 6* page
17 or John H„ Kautsky* "Myth, Self-fulfilling Prophesy, and
Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict,’* Journal of
Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965), 1-17, reprinted in
Peter A„ Toma and Andrew Gyorgy* Basic Issues in International Relations (Boston? Allyn & Bacon* 1967), PP. 277295 o
^ T h e s e objectives are summarized from SokolovskyJs
wo r k 0 They are explained and described in greater detail
in the following paragraphs., V„ I„ Sokolovsky* ojd0 cit<,,
p p 0 9^-100* 102-107, 271-274, 334=
S„ Khrushchev* A speech to the VI Congress of
the German United Socialist Party, Pravda9 Jan0 17, 1963,
Current Digest, XV* N o 0 1* 13-17°
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However, the Soviets are not--like the United
States--necessarily interested in deterring all wars,

They

hope to deter world war because they recognize the disad
vantages for theme

On the other hand, they actively support

so-called "just wars of liberation” as a method of pro
moting communism in situations where they have a strategic
advantageo

Premier Khrushchev5s speech of January 6 , 1961 ,

belongs to that species of policy statements in which the
communist leadership discloses its interpretation of com
munist dogma and sets forth the long-range objectives of
their policy 0

In the speech, Khrushchev redefined the use

of war as an instrument of the communist revolutiono
Khrushchev admonished his listeners to distinguish between
various kinds of w a n

”A war of liberation of a people for

its independence is a sacred war.
w a r s 0”
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We recognize such

By his definition, such wars fall within the

framework of peaceful co-existence, and aggression occurs
only when the United States--the imperialists--seek to
block developing area advances by force or by non-violent
methodso

Among the resolutions adopted by the 22nd Con

gress of the CPSU were the following?
The 22nd Party Congress considers it necessary
to? steadily and consistently implement the
21

No So Khrushchev, A speech delivered to a Meet
ing of the Party Organizations in the Higher Party School,
Janc 6, 1961, Current Digest, XIII, No» 1, 3-4o
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principle of the peaceful co-existence of states
with different social systems as the general
security policy of the Soviet Union; » „ «
develop and deepen cooperation with the national
liberation armies fighting for independence from
colonial oppression; » <> 022
With regard to the developing areas, Soviet
security policy speaks in terms of ’’national liberation
movements” but does not discuss in detail the strategies
appropriate to these movements„

It is difficult to find

evidence of substantial military expenditures in aid of
such revolutions.

Indeed, Jan F„ Triska and David D c

Finley categorically state that the Russians do not offi
cially send arms to the emerging nations<,^3

However,

the UoSi State Department, in 1962, listed military aid
as totaling ten per cent of the Soviet-bloc credits to the
developing areas„

The bulk of this military aid purportedly

went to Egypt and I n d o n e s i a S u f f i c e

it to say, for

present purposes, that Soviet interest in the emerging
world has relatively few security connotations--at least
at face value„
22»»Resolutions Adopted by the 22nd Party Congress,”
Pravda, November 7, 1962, Current Digest, XIV, N o 0 7,
23Jan Fo Triska and David D„ Finley (eds,), Soviet
Foreign Policy (New Yorks MacMillan and Co„, 196$),

p 0 272o
2% o S o Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, The Sjno-Soviet Offensive Through 1961, Intel
ligence Report NOo 8426 (Washington, DoC„, 1 9 6 2 ) as cited
in Peter A 0 Toma, "The Problem of Foreign Aid,” East Europe,
XV (Feb. 1963), 2-9o
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The stated Soviet objective of total and complete
disarmament seems to go further than the American desires
in this regard,,

Premier Khrushchev stated on June 15»

1961 r
If these /disarmament/ proposals of ours are
accepted,* the peoples will forever be rid of
the heavy burden of the arms race. We have
stated, and I repeat, categorically, that if
the Western powers agree to general and total
disarmament, the Soviet Union is ready to
accept any system of control,, „ „ „ In order
to preserve and strengthen peace, it is neces
sary to solve the problem of general and com
plete disarmament with effective control,, The
Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed that
nuclear missiles be ended, that all weapons,
including all stockpiles of nuclear bombs and
their production banned forever„25
Published Yiews on Soviet space policy have under
gone rapid change in the past two years.

Prior to 1962,

the Soviets claimed that their space program was directed
only toward peaceful and scientific use„

While they con

tinue to articulate a peaceful intent, they now argue
that demonstrated U 0So intentions to exploit space for mili
tary purposes have made it necessary for the Soviets also
to consider using space for military purposes .26

Thus they

25N o S. Khrushchev, Radio and Television Address,
June 15 s, 1961, Pravda, June 16, Current Digest, XIII,
No. 24, 3-So Robert N„ Ginsbergh suggests that this objec
tive seems to envisage a situation in which the disarmed
West could not oppose the advance of communism by any means,
in U 0S 0 Military Strategy in the Sixties (New York:
Norton, 1965), p. 12'3„
2^This point will be enlarged upon in the next
chapter under the subheading of space research. For instant
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no longer insist that the military use of space is illegal
and they point to Soviet space exploits as a clear demon
stration of their superiority over the United States— a
superiority which includes the capability of placing
nuclear weapons in orbit and delivering them accurately
to any part of the g l o b e . ^

The implication of their

shifting attitudes toward space warfare is not yet com
pletely apparent, although a former 7iee Chief of Staff of
the U.S. M r Force has concluded that this is the area in
which "one of us probably will find the key to the stra
tegic superiority of the 1 9 7 0 fs.’*:^
Finally,, any consideration of national security
policy must deal with the organizational machinery by which
it is devised and implemented.

It will not serve the pur

poses of this study to dwell upon the bureaucratic struc
tures of national security policy-making.

However, for

purposes that will become apparent in the next chapter 5,
there is a structure deemed worthy of note: the elite ad
visory body on national security matters.
reference, see the article by B 0 Sin|gh, "Law As a Political
Instrument: A Soviet Model," World Justice, 711 (Sept.
1 9 6 6 ), 442-453o
^ S o k o l o v s k y , o£. cit., pp. 66, 176-179> 337* 424427 o
As quoted in Robert D. Crane, Soviet Nuclear
Strategy, ojd. cit. , p. 62. Developments such as this one
would seem to lend credence to the action-reaction-selffulfilling-prophesy syndrome as suggested by Kautsky, "Myth,"
o p . cit., see note 1 6 , pp. 2 6 - 2 7 of this paper.

The American National Security Council was estab
lished by the National Security Act of 1947°

Its stated

function is to advise the President with respect to the
"integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security so as to enable the mili
tary services and the other departments of the Government
to cooperate more effectively in matters of national
s e c u r i t y F u r t h e r m o r e , the duties of the Council are
"to assess and appraise" the objectives and commitments
of the United States in relation "to its actual and poten
tial military power, in the interest of national security,
for the purposes of making recommendations to the Presi
dent
The National Security Act also provided the
United States with a tightly organized intelligence sys
tem,,

Section 102 (d) spells out the function of this

agency0

The Central Intelligence Agency shall advise the

National Security Council concerning such activities as
affect the national security,,^

Thus the CIA acts as the

eyes and ears of the president, through the National
Security Council, in foreign relations involving the
2% a t i o n a l Security Act of 1947» 61 Stat„ 496,
50 UoSo0oAo 401, SOth Congress (19473°
3°Ibido at 497, U.S.C.A. 403°
31Ibido at 499, U.SoC.A,. 407°
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national security of the United States„
The CIA presents a peculiar paradox among the many
stemming from the conflict between security and American
valueso

At the entrance to the CIA headquarters is the

inscription:

"Ye shall know the truth, and the truth

shall make you free."32

let the CIA does not confirm or

deny published reports; never explains its organizations;
never identifies its personnel; and will not discuss its
budget, its method of operation, or its sources of infor33
mation. J

So the citizen, as far as the CIAfs managers

are concerned, cannot, in fact, know the truth about an
agency, the directorship of which has been described as
"second only in importance to the President."^
This situation confronts the American system of
government with a two-sided problem: how can there be public
control over functions that require secrecy; and how can
the effective operation of a two-party system of government
32ciA,s attachment to this inscription reflects the
belief of intelligence professionals in the existence of an
objective Mtruth" in world affairs. If "all facts" are
gathered, they seem to assume, then the problems of policymakers are virtually self-solving. This myth is shared by
many policy-makers0 See P 0 W'. Blackstock, The Strategy of
Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1 9 6 4 ), pp° 43-49°
33ciA, "The Central Intelligence Agency" (mimeo for
restricted circulation), Spring, 19o1, pp. 7-9° Existence
of this pamphlet, itself, seems inconsistent with the
policy contained therein.
ings,

3^U0So, Senate, Committee o,n Armed Services, Hear
Nomination of J, McCone, January 1&, 1962, p. 30°
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be assured when control of the Executive branch gives the
party in power a potentially exclusive access to essential
information in the field of foreign security policy*-^
The first aspect of the foregoing dilemma has cer
tain ramifications which are significant to this study*
The statute creating the CIA provides explicitly that the
Agency and the National Security Council are not decision
making bodies*

Intelligence agencies must have this detach

ment from policy in order to assure the most forthright
reporting on international affairs*

However, the secrecy

aspect of such an agency allows its functionaries either
to develop its own policies or to lose contact with the
informational needs of the elite*-^

When this condition

occurs the intelligence network is no longer merely an in
strument of policy b u t , in fact, wields "invisible” power
either in the policy-making process,
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or in clandestine

35These two problems form the crux of H* H* Ransomfs thesis in Can America Survive the Cold War? (New
Yorks Doubleday, 1963)*
^ R o g e r Hilsman Jr* recognizes this implication
in "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,"
as printed in James N* Rosenau, International Politics
and Foreign Policy (New Yorks
Free Press, 1961},
~
pp* 209-219°
3?The concept of the "invisible" policy-maker is
described in William M* McGovern, Strategic Intelligence
and the Shape of Tomorrow (Chicagos Regnery, 19&1),
pp* 23-28*
——— —
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operations in other countries,,^

The effect of this

dilemma will be explored in the next chapter„
Let us now turn to the institutional role of for
eign intelligence in Soviet foreign policy,,

The Soviet

Union understandably publishes little information about
its function,,

The description presented here is pieced

together from fragmentary information publicly accessible„
We are not directly concerned here with the SecretPolice institutions for internal security of the Soviet
state against its enemies,,

The institutions that are

directly involved in the foreign policy process are those
concerned with foreign espionage„

These have been part of

the Secret Police throughout its history*
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The Central

Committee for State Security is composed of subdivisions
of three varieties t

Main Administrations distinguished

by function*^
The First Main Administration (Foreign Directorate)
is charged with five continuing tasks"

(a) collection of

strategic intelligence regarding foreign countries;
(b) manufacture and dissemination of long-range propaganda;
3$For a good discussion of intervention in foreign
internal politics see H* B„ Westerfield* The Instruments
of Americans Foreign Policy (New York;
Crowell, 1963),
pp* 401-491.
39For a concise history of Soviet intelligence
institutions 3 see Triska and F i n l e y 0£» cit„ 9 p 0 4 6 0
^°Ibid0, po 4 7 o
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(c) surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad;

(d) penetra

tion and neutralization of anti-Soviet organizations
abroad; and (e) supervision of intelligence efforts of
other Soviet intelligence organizations,,
According to E 0 A„ Andreevich* the operators of
the First Main Administration work through various Missions
to foreign countries*^

I could find reliable information

on the Mission in Burma to provide an example
The Political Intelligence group in Burma was the
largest (eleven members) and most authoritative0

It was

directed and staffed by the KGB (Committee for State
Security) and was primarily an operational agencyo

Its

primary objective was penetration and subversion of the
local political regime through active participation in the
domestic party struggle„
mation was s e c o n d a r y <,^-3

Analysis and gathering of infor
According to Kaznacheev, none of

the policy decisions themselves were made from the mission,,
These emanated from Moscow, or, probably in most cases,
from the Party leadership,,
^ E 0 A. Andreevich, "Structure and Functions of
the Soviet Secret Police," in S„ Wolin and R„ M„ Slusser
(edSo), The Soviet Secret Police (New York:
Praeger,
1957), pp7_96^T?9o
—
Ao Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy:
Ex
periences of a Soviet Diplomat in Burma (Philadelphia;
LippincottT" 1962)o
”
43i b i d Q ,

p p0 1 8S~202o
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Some account should be taken here of the context in
which the Soviet Mission has been described0

The circum

stances both of time and place undoubtedly mean that some
of the specifics are applicable only to Burma„

It is to be

expected that different environments would reveal differ
ent organizational emphases„

However, the general struc

ture and function of the Foreign Directorate in a develop
ing country is representative,,
The foregoing summary of Soviet-American security
objectives is designed to give the reader some perspective
when he encounters the "’non-security" objectives of Chapter
IIo

Each of these security objectives will be repeated in

Chapter II when it becomes involved with the attainment of
a particular non-security objective„

The next chapters,

therefore» will concern itself with three considerations;
first, the nonsecurity objectives of the United States and
the Soviet Union are presented; second, Soviet-American
non-security objectives are compared for compatibility and
divergence; and third, these objectives are analyzed in
view of the various aspects of security objectives to
demonstrate the effect security objectives have upon the
attainment of non-security objectives.

CHAPTER I I

NON-SECURITY POLICY:

AN ANALYSIS

It is to be recalled that there are five subcate
gories of "non-security” foreign policy objectives: foreign
trade; foreign aid; aid to international organizations;
space research; and cultural interchange„

Soviet and Ameri

can objectives in each of these subcategories are discussed
below,

The last part of the discussion in each of the

subcategories is devoted to an analysis of the objectives
in the light of national security policy.
Foreign Trade
United States Objectives
Emergence of an increasingly prosperous, internally
cohesive European Common Market in the early 1960!s signaled
the end of a long era in American international economic
relations,
courseso

American policy-makers could follow one of two
They could endeavor to insulate the American eco

nomic system from the impact of growing competition,abroad.
O r 3 they could chart a new course in the direction of
liberalized and expanded trade by endeavoring to promote
the maximum exchange of goods and services throughout the
38
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world0

Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, a number of

advisors vigorously advocated the former course*

Accord

ing to this point of view, America’s economic welfare
would be promoted to the extent that segments of American
industry damaged by imports would be shielded by high
tariffs designed to protect the system from "unfair” com
petition,,^
The Kennedy Administration decided against this
policy*

In its view, the economic well-being of the nation

would be far better served by imaginative policies seeking
to expand global trade— even if this meant significant re
duction in American trade barriers*

The overall conclu

sion, in the words of a writer for the Wall Street Journal,
was that "it would be folly to suppose that other nations
would lower their tariff barriers against American goods
while the United States is putting fresh obstacles in the
p

way of imports*'1
These were the principal factors in inducing the
Kennedy Administration to sponsor a new tariff measure
called the Trade Expansion Act of 1962*

TEA preserved the

earlier idea of reciprocal tariff reductions, but it also
iFor an argument in support of this position, see
Douglas McCarthur II, "United States Trade Relations with
the New Europe," Department of State Bulletin, #4$ (Feb* 4,
1963), p* 173*
^Wall Street Journal, Aug* 23, 1961, p* 1*
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added new features not found in former trade legislation.
The bill provided that;

(1) authority be granted to the

President to reduce tariff rates on a reciprocal basis;
(2) authority be given to the President to eliminate tariffs
altogether on products in which the United States and the
Common Market countries collectively account for more than
eighty per cent of global trade;

(3) authority be given to

American negotiators to secure reciprocal tariff agreements
on categories of products instead of having to secure agree
ments on thousands of individual items that might be traded
between the United States and other countries;

(4) there

be no tariff cuts on imports when a danger exists that U 0S 0
defense industries might be damaged by tariff reductions
The TEA was designed to fulfill President Kennedy8s
conception of a "bold new instrument" for achieving Ameri
can goals, which he summarized as follows;

1o

to increase UoS„ competition opportunities in
overseas markets;

2,

to discourage UoSo economic isolation;

3o

to prevent domestic inflation;

4°

to increase export surplus;

5o

to achieve equilibrium in the U 0S» balance

3These and other provisions of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 are discussed in Congressional Quarterly
U m a n a c , XVIII (1962), 249-295o
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of payments,^
Soviet Objectives
The first appearance of a specifically stated Soviet
foreign trade policy came in Khrushchev’s formulation of
the 1961 Central Committee Report,

It is not surprising

that resolutions on the international economic scene later
adopted by the Soviet Congress assiduously followed Khrush
chev’s themes.

According to the First Secretary himself*

the report had been scrutinized and approved by each member
of the Politburo,5

The Central Committee had presumably

inspected and ratified the text when meeting for that pur
pose a week before the Congress opened.
There were six major themes regarding Soviet for
eign trade policy.

The following formulations are my sum

maries * using so far as possible the words of the original:
il

Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union to the XXlInd Party Congress--Report by
Comrade N, S, K h r u s h c h e v , fhe Central Committee Report
^-J, F, Kennedy* A speech to the United States Senate*
January 31* 1962* Public Papers of the President--Kennedy*
1962 (Washington* D 0C,? U„S, Government Printing Office*
W ) , p p , 68-69.
^Pravda and Izvetsia* October 16* 1961* pp, 2-11*
as translated by S 0 Saikowski and N, Gruliow (eds,)* Current
Soviet Policies IV (lew Yorks Columbia University Press*
T9625* p, 42,
~
^Ibid,* pp, 43-46,

not only described the international environment but located
the Soviet Union within it and identified tasks for the
Soviet Union with regard to it„

The position of the UoS.SoRo

included the following trade objectives?
1o

to improve mutually advantageous economic ties
with the socialist countries on the basis of
long-term
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coordinated plans;

to seek normalized relations with the United
States, built on principles of peaceful eco
nomic competition;

3o

to seek a greater volume of trade with the non
socialist countries and the reduction of ob
stacles to trade;

4o

to expand petroleum lines in Europe;

5o

to seek a Soviet-Japanese trade agreement and
to develop cooperation with the great powers
of Asia and Indonesia on a business-like basis„

If one were to compare the foreign trade objectives
of the two countries, he would find that they are quite
similaro

Both countries seek to expand foreign trade with

other nations of the worldo

In doing so, both hope that

the domestic picture will improve? the Soviets in terms of
advancing production; the Americans in terms of increasing
internal economic competition and of meeting the balance
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of paymentso

The Soviets seek new sourees of supply to

speed their rate of industrialization.

They are willing

to secure such supplies both from the countries of Western
Europe and the United States.

The Americans lowered tariffs

to increase the volume of imports in order to achieve a
parity in the balance of payments and to stimulate competi
tion internally and with the European Economic Gommunity„
There is one point of divergence.

The United States

maintains a list of "strategic goods" to protect its defense
industries.

These goods are protected by high tariffs and

other restrictions.

Briefly, the essence of the "strategic

list" is as follows: if a certain industry is vital to
national security it is desirable to ensure a market for
domestic producers by granting protection.
domestic sources of supply will be built up.

In this manner,
It is rela

tively easy, and I suspect quite natural, for an industry
to persuade the Tariff Commission or Congress to allow them
to come under the national security u m b r e l l a T h e tuna
fish industry has argued, with support of the Navy, that it
is affected by national security considerations since it

^Raymond Vernon makes this point quite forcefully
in "Foreign Trade and National Defense," Foreign Affairs
Oct. 1955, p. 77ff.
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supplies vessels in war time.

d

The lace manufacturers

have claimed defense status since they produce mosquito
netso^

"In the name of national security, the dairy lobby

succeeded in restricting imports of foreign cheese „ „ „
and the lead-pencil manufacturers claimed defense status
10
because pencils were ’indispensable„’tt

The absurdity

of these seemingly altruistic claims illustrates the strong
tendency for vested interests to wrap themselves in the
vestiges of national security policy,,
These discriminatory restrictions not only de
crease the volume of U „ S „ imports, but they have the effect
of making it more difficult for the Soviet Union to sell
in the West, and therefore adversely affects the expansion
of East-West trade„

Particular harm to East-West trade

is done by uncertainty about changes in the strategic list
and by divergent application of the rules by different
countries„

Thus chemical machinery exported by Britain or

West Germany may contain items covered by American patents,
whereupon the United States applies its more restrictive

% o S , , Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimen
sions of Foreign Economic Power, $7th Cong*, 2nd Sess„,
T962, Po 7o
~
9vernon, "Foreign Trade » „ ." ago cit. , p 0 S0„
10Ibid„, po 79 o
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definition and impedes sale to the socialist countries
The case of the ban on exports of steel pipe is an even
worse one0
In 1961, shortly before a French-Soviet trade agree
ment was consummated, the United States placed steel pipe
on its list of strategic goodso

The agreement involved

sale of this commodity to the Soviet Union, who intended
to use the pipe to increase the volume of oil export to
Eastern and Western Europe„
the strategic ban„

The French reluctantly honored

A ccording to Soviet comment, the agree

ment would have tripled the 1957 trade volume between the
two countries*

The spirit of mutual understanding surround

ing the negotiations was unprecedented and strategic
restrictions observed by France were deplored as the only
obstacles to an even closer relationship,.

12

It may be that

the cancellation of the undertaking to supply steel pipe
contributed to the failure of the EEC to fulfill the plan
for gas in 1964, and so led to a fuel shortage*^

it is a

matter of opinion that fear of repetition of such tactics
^ F o r further discussion of this transaction, see
Bo Balassa, Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Coun
tries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp° 32-37°
f o Triska and Ho Slusser, The theory and Law
of Soviet Treaties (Palo Alto, C a l i f S t a n f o r d University
Press, 1963), p° 361 „

”*3see the news story on p, 3 of the New York Times,
Octo 3, 1964c
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must affect the willingness of Eastern planners to rely on
Western suppliers for important items*

It is a matter not

of opinion but of obvious certainty that such acts will not
encourage East-West trade expansion.,
American relaxation of strategic trade restrictions
might lead to a broader range of Western European— particularly German— exports to the Soviet Union*

Indeed*

many Germans argue that since the Bonn government rules out
most negotiations with Eastern European states, trade rela
tions offer a means of establishing personal contacts which
may eventually wean the East Germans away from Moscow.
The Soviets have not been innocent of the afore
mentioned restrictions*
tactic*

They simply employ a different

The Russians have made attempts to increase for

eign trade, but relative to their total trade volume, rela
tions with non-socialist countries have remained quite
small*^5

When the Soviets do trade with countries outside

their orbit, it is likely to be with smaller states like
^ T r i s k a and Slusser,' The Theory . . . , ojd* cit* *
p* 362* Lord Keynes develops the theory that increased
trade reduces antagonism and furthers the cause of peace
in "National Self-sufficiency,n Yale Review (Summer, 1933)?
especially pp* 756ff* The theory is tested by David Mitrany
in A Working Peace System (New York? Random House, 1946)*
He quite effectively argues that the bonds of international
order can be forged more rapidly by first concentrating on
common problems in the less sensitive spheres of economic
affairs *
^C.E.lo, East-West Trade (New York, 196$), p* 1$„
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Egypt or Burmao

Egyptian cotton sent to Russia was dropped

on the West German markets at low prices thus damaging the
local markets for Egyptian cotton.,
of Burmese rice0^

The same has been true

This evidence indicates that Soviet

trade, up to the present, has been more of a "come on"
device to cause dissension in the Western World than a
device to create firm associations through the exchange of
goodSo
It will be recalled that there is a mutual design
on the part of both countries to expand foreign trade to
improve domestic economies°

The cost of maintaining and

improving a spectrum level military posture has a signifi
cant effect on the attainment of that goal»

In 1963, the

United States experienced a $4°3 billion deficit in its
balance of p a y m e n t s I n

the same year the United States

spent $4o1 billion on nuclear weapons alone»

It could

be argued that a reduction of nuclear arms spending could
be used to cover the balance of payments deficit.

In any

case, a re-allocation of resources under arms control could
^% e w York Times, Jan 0 5 , 1962, p° 13° For a more
detailed discussion of "dumping,* see UoN„E„SoC 00 „ , ,TWays
and Means of Promoting Trade" (E/3 3 8 9 )., June 13, 1963°
^Statistical Abstract of the United States , 1963
(U°S„ Department of Commerce, Washington, D „ C 0? UoS„
Government Printing Office, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 257°
1^Ibid o, p c 19 S 0
s'
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ease the U<,S„ balance problem by reducing the need for im
ports of both industrial and mineral products,,
A reduction in military procurement would also
alleviate some of the Soviet economic problems by freeing
for civilian purposes some of the best resources in the
Soviet economy,,

These specialized resources are needed

and presently lacking for the expansion of Soviet industry
Arms reduction would also permit the Soviet regime to re
lease labor for the civilian economy, as it did in 1955$
when two million men were demobilized,,

20

Such additional

manpower would make it easier to increase agricultural out
put o

More equipment, fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides

from the chemical industry, which has neglected these pro
ducts to concentrate on military items such as plastics and
fuels for missiles, could be used to increase agricultural
production„^

There seems to be complete agreement that a

cutback in arms spending, particularly in the Soviet Union,
would give a tremendous boost to internal economic
19Seymour Melman (ed„), Disarmament;
Its Politics
and Economics (Boston;
The American Academy, 1962), p„ 140 „
20jo G„ Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military
E s t a b l i s h m e n t Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Studies
Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, $7th Congo, 2nd
Sesso, p„ 43 o
21 This argument follows J„ P„ Hardt, "Strategic
Alternatives in Soviet Resource Allocation Policy,” in
Dimensions„ op0 cit„8 pp„ l8-20„
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developmento

22

Military spendings as it exists today, can

only hinder and delay economic progress in both the United
States and the Soviet Union„
Foreign Aid
United States Objectives
In his annual Budget Message to Congress for 1963*
President Kennedy stressed the following principles as
American foreign aid objectives;
1„

to

promote the economic development of coun

tries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;
2<, to give assistance in relation to the ability
and willingness of developing countries to
help themselves;
3o

to make loans on reasonable terms rather than
grants and to accept payment in dollars rather
than local currency;

4»

to secure participation in foreign assistance
by other industrialized nations and to increase

22James L 0 Clayton argues that defense expenditures
served as a catalyst to push California's growth rate to
unprecedented levels0 As a result, according to Clayton,
the economy of the whole state was given new impetus and a
lofty position of political power,, He does, however, leave
the reader with the question of whether such a concentra
tion of defense spending is really "good” for California,,
See James L 0 Clayton, "Defense Spending; Key to Califor
nia's Growth," printed in Davis B° Bobrow, Components of
Defense Policy (Chicago; Rand McNally, 19 6 5 }, pp» 175190o
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the role of private resources in assistance;
5»

to support the steady growth of responsible,
independent governments which will not be hos
tile to the

W e s t „ 2 3

Several significant trends in the formulation and
administration of the foregoing objectives have proved note
worthy o

A fundamental one has been the evolution from

primary reliance upon economic assistance (1943-1952), to
primary reliance on military assistance (from 1952-1959),
to establishment of a rough equilibrium between these two
categories (1960-1965)
Second, the shift from outright grants to loans as
the basic element in American foreign aid programs has been
pronounced.

During the era of the Marshall Plan, some

ninety per cent of all American aid consisted of grants to
other countries; by 1964? sixty per cent of all aid con
sisted of loans, often made on long-term bases with low
interest r a t e s . ^
Third, there has been a tendency toward greater
selectivity in the provision of American foreign assistance..
23public Papers of the President--Kennedv, 1963,
OP o Clto , PP o
1°
^ A g e n c y for International Development, The Story
of AID (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
no date).
D 8G o “

25a i D, The Foreign Aid/Program Today (Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 4.
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In the face of mounting legislative criticism of the for
eign aid program* executive officials have carried out
repeated reorganization of the principles which guide the
extension of foreign assistance to other nations,,*^

By

the early 1960’s, David E„ Bell, administrator of AID,
said that his agency was following a policy of ”careful
selectivity” in making aid allocations;
We are stressing aid to those countries where
the United States interest is most urgent, which
are in a position to make the best use of our
help, and where other donors cannot supply all
the aid needed,, As a result, of the $2„2 bil
lion committed to &2 countries by AID in fiscal
year 1963, four-fifths went to only 20 countries,,

'

As was noted above, United States foreign aid can
be divided into two basic categories; military and non
military assistanceo

To put the matter into some perspec

tive, the following table shows the types of aid dealt with
in the annual Foreign Assistance Act„
The information in Table 1 demonstrates one funda
mental characteristic of U„So foreign aid„

Military expen

ditures consistently account for one-half of the total
foreign aid budget and have taken as much as a fifty-eight
26por a critical look at the legislative study re
ferred to here, see "Report of the Clay Commission on For
eign Aid,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (Sept„ 1963),
321-361o
2?AID, Foreign Aid „ „ 0 ,

cit., p„ 10„
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TABLE 1
UoSo FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS, 1960-1965a
Congressional Appropriations
(millions of dollars)
1960
1962
1961
1963
1964

1965

Development Loans

750

730

806

812

745

770

Development
Grants

335

301

275

260

210

204

Alliance for
Progress^

—— ,

103

110

120

140

Miscellaneous0

500

620

1000

740

740

425
200

Total NonMilitary

1620

1725

2225

1840

1800

1620

Military
Assistance

1720

1374

1450

1600

1500

1190

250

275

275

360

305

400

1970

1649

1725

2160

1805

1590

Total Foreign Aid 3 5GO

3390

3960

4110

3640

3340

Supporting
Assistance^
Total Military

aSources
Statistical Abstract of the United States—
1968 (LLS* Department of. Commerce, Washington, D.G.: -D 0S 0
Government Printing Office, 1969) <»
^Excludes technical assistance and development grants„
Gome part of this expenditure undoubtedly went for military
purposes, although it was difficult to determine the per
centage o
cIncludes appropriations for the Contingency Fund,
International organizations, Administrative Expenses, and
American schools and hospitals abroad,,
^Supporting assistance is designed to assure access
to strategic military bases apd to enable the maintenance
of larger armed forces for the common defense„ South Korea,
South Vietnam, Laos and Jordan have consistently received
eighty per cent of these funds0

53

per cent slice of the assistance appropriations..

Another

striking fact is that President Johnson5s first foreign
aid budget was sharply reduced.

Military appropriations,

however, remained stabilized.
Soviet Objectives
In his Central Committee Report to the XXIIIrd
Party Congress in March, 1966, General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev concluded his seetion devoted to the developing
areas by succinctly restating the Soviet foreign aid policy
formulated by Chairman Khrushchev ten years earlier;
"Our Party and the Soviet State will continue „ „ „u
1.

to promote the economic development of coun
tries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;

2.

to finance projects which contribute to the
industrialization of the recipients;

3.

to limit aid to loans with low interest rates;

4 . to accept repayment

of loans in commodities

which the borrowers traditionally export;
5o

to grant assistance without imposing political
or economic conditions;

6.

to support the steady growth of responsible,
independent governments which will not be
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hostile to the East0^
Drawing heavily upon a perceptive article by David
Beim,

29

let us examine how closely the Soviets have fol

lowed these objectives.,

Early Soviet commitments can

generally be classified as efforts for temporary assist
ance to balance American aide

Soviet aid was concentrated

in spectacular projects such as stadiums, hotels and dams,
which appealed to the target regimes but accomplished little
more„

In subsequent years most of the Soviet aid sought

economic development„

Beim, analyzing all communist party

aid through 1 9 6 3 , comes to the conclusion that eighty-five
per cent was devoted to establishing and maintaining economic development

30

According to Beim, the Soviets hoped to develop
ideological compatibility with the recipient countries by
playing upon the developing areas® susceptibility to charges
of Western imperialist motives and drawing maximum inter
national attention to each commitment*

However, to the

2Sprav d a , March 30, 1966, as translated in Current
Digest, XVIII, No., 7, 23-37» To note the parallels between
Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s position see the former’s
speech to the XXth Congress, Pravda, F e b 0 17, 1956, as
translated in Current Digest» VIII, No„ 4, 6-7°
^^David Beim, MThe Communist Bloc and the Foreign
Aid Game,” Western Political Quarterly, XVII (Dec. 1 9 6 4 ),
764-799o
3°Ibido, p. 794o
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discomfiture of the USSR, the anti-imperialist dynamics did
not extend to the adoption of Soviet political forms or
support for Soviet international positions„

For example,

while Nassar was eager to accept Soviet assistance at Aswan
Dam, he was not willing to take a benevolent attitude
toward domestic communists„

Quite the contrary--he sup

pressed the Communist Party in Egypt„

Iraq, also culti

vated by Soviet economic aid, similarly turned resistant
31
toward a pereeived internal communist threat»
of disappointments could be extended„

The list

Suffice it to say,

in late 1960 the Soviet Union abruptly suspended new aid
commitments <,
Soviet leadership resumed making new aid commitments
in the latter half of 1 9 6 3 , now apparently hoping for re32
cipient neutrality„

By 1 9 6 4 , the Soviet Union again

announced extensions of $$90 million„

This amount was con

sistently increased and reached a peak of $1265 million in
1965o

Relative to the Soviet gross national product, this

sum approximates the amount of assistance granted to the
new world by the United States in that year 0
According to Beim, Soviet military assistance is
^ Ma rs ha ll I„ Goldman, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet
Foreign Aid,” Foreign Affairs, XLIII, N o 0 2 (Jan. 1965),
350ffo
3%),, Beim, "The Communist Bloc 0 ,
Po 795o

OjD, cit0,
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primarily ”a verbal contingency promise,”

Soviet policy

appears to be restricted to the assurance that in the event
they should be attacked they may be confident of Soviet
TABLE 2
SOVIET FOREIGN AID TO THE DEVELOPING
AREAS, 19 59 .65 a
1200

1265
1154.5

1100
1000

1090

900

890

Millions
800
of United

748,5

700
States

600
552.2

dollars.

500

400
300
200
171 .4
100
0

1959

’ 60

’ 61

'62

’63

*64

information gathered from M. D. Simon, "Communist
Interaction with the Developing States” (Stanford Studies
of the Communist System, January 1966), printed in The Com
munist Economic Offensive through 1965, U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Intelligence, RSB-65 (Washington, D„C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).

'65
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assistance.-^

Doubtless, sizable quantities of arms have

been delivered piecemeal to rebellious factions in coun
tries as yet unfreed from "colonial b o n d a g e B u t
has not formally involved the Soviet state.34

this

Apparently,

the encouragement of social disorder through military
means contradicts Soviet efforts to woo insecure regimes;
this gambit is left to the Chinese„
In comparing the foreign aid objectives of the
United States and the Soviet Union, a substantial amount of
compatibility is evident.

Both countries seek to promote

economic development in the third world and to foster the
growth of responsible, independent governments.

A substan

tial proportion of the assistance granted by both countries
is in the form of loans, rather than gifts.

The two coun

tries differ with respect to the segment of the economy
they wish to develop.

The Soviets encourage industrial

development specifically.

The United States seems to be

33Ibid., p. 793; cf. Uri Ra* anan, "Tactics in the
Third foprid." Survey, LVII (Oct. 1965), 30-34.
34see note 23, page 29. According to Geoffry Kent,
there was a substantial increase in Soviet arms shipments,
particularly to Egypt, in 1967. However, Kent qualifies
his figures by stating that "it has not been Soviet policy
to provide its clients with what, in Western terms, would
be considered a satisfactory military capability."
G. Kent, "Strategy and Arms Levels, 1945-196$," Proceedings,
Academy of Political Science, XX IX , No. 3 (19o9), 21-36.
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indifferent as to the area in which the assistance is used.
This difference is hardly significant and seemingly comple
mentary,

The most notable divergence is the manner in

which the aid is distributed.,

The United States allocates

more than half of its aid to be used for military purposes0
The Soviet Union earmarks nearly all of its aid for eco
nomic development,

This distinction holds ramifications

for the instant thesis„
What has happened, then, is that the United States
and the Soviet Union have assumed the task of ’’neutraliza
tion” of the developing areas as a means of supplementing
the effect of mutual deterrence„

A program of fostering

economic development and military posture has been seized
upon by both powers as a means of limiting the expansion
of the other.
However, as long as aid is given as a tactic of
security policy, a certain number of disastrous conse
quences for the future of the new world will develop.

The

maintenance of foreign aid as a tactical weapon of security
policy has lead to impressive military expenditures in the
underdeveloped countries.

Military aid is bound to have an

impact upon the distribution of political power within a
recipient country; it can also have a deleterious effect
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upon the economic system of that country.^

Military

aid incites the country to engage in unproductive arms
expenditures, which become weapons in the hands of opposing
groups within each country,,

Each group strives to use the

arms to further its own particular interest, thereby dis
rupting the political development of the country and deem
ing impossible achievement of the very goal the contri
buting country intends„
Political disruption and unproductive arms expen
ditures frustrate the economic development of the country
and prevent it from entering the world market except for
the sale of raw materials and agricultural commodities„
All manufactured goods must continue to be purchased abroad„
Instead of attempting to encourage efficiency through in
vestment of "social overhead capital,” the assisting coun
tries have encouraged small arms races.

The recipient

countries are thus unable to satisfy the national demand
for the goods of a modern society,,
This is also the appropriate place to note the
effect of a large amount of foreign aid on the United States
economy itselfo

As was noted in the section on foreign

trade, the United States has been running large
-^^This point is reaffirmed by Hans Morgenthau in
"A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political
Science Review, LVI (June 19o2), 301-310„
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international deficits, which have averaged some $4 billion
per year and which in the second quarter of 1963 rose to an
annual equivalent rate of over $5 billion , ^

This is the

same year that.$1,6 'billion in U , S 0 military assistance was
granted to the developing areas.
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The problem arises out of the nature of the deficits themselves,

These deficits have not originated in

the merchandise balance of trade, which has usually shown
substantial surpluses.

Rather, the main deficit items have

been direct military expenditures abroad and the portion of
UoS, foreign economic assistance earmarked for military use.
The dilemma is that neither of these two items can be re
duced by domestic monetary restraint.

Foreign military aid

and foreign military expenditures are, therefore, direct
causes of U,S. balance of payments deficits and will con
tinue to be unless (1) the volume of trade is significantly
increased to create a larger surplus or (2) military assist
ance is discontinued,

3 % . S„ Salant, et al,, The U,S . Balance of Pay
ments (Washington, D 0C„; Brookings Institution, 1966),
p, 201,
37For convenient reference see Table 2, page $2,
3$The argument here draws heavily upon J, W» Angell,
"The U,S. International Payments Deficit," Political Science
Quarterly, LXXIX (March 1964), 1-24,
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Participation in International
Organizations
United States Objectives
The financial troubles besetting the United Nations
operations had become sufficiently grave by 1962 to re
quire new measures for raising funds if the organization’s
activities were not to founder on the rocks of bankruptcy„
Accordingly, the United States proposed the floating of a
\
$200 million bond issue (American officials proposed that
the United States, itself, purchase half the bonds), to
gether with a series of steps designed to relieve the UN
of its financial distress *

When this request was presented

to Congress, it precipitated a lengthy and sometimes heated
debate hetween legislative and executive officials, con
cerning the American role in the United Nations cA®
In the end, Congress reluctantly accepted a modi
fied version of the Kennedy Administration’s request for
massive American support in solving the U N ’s financial
crisiso

Congress authorized the Treasury Department to

purchase up to a total of $100 million; the Treasury was
prohibited, however, from making total purchases in excess
39UN Economic and Social Council, Official Records
(New York, 1963); cf« New York Times, March 22, 1964* for”
a list of deficits by country, p 0 1 3 <>
^ F o r a record of these debates, see UoSo, Congress,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Review of U„S, Par
ticipation in the United Nations, Hearings, &7th Cong-,
1st Sesso, 1962o Later cited as Review,
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of the total purchase by all other countries„

The Congres

sional authorization in this particular instance was impor
tant for two reasons?

(t) it marked a point of careful

reconsideration of D»S. objectives in granting assistance
to international organizations and (2) these objectives
were carefully articulated to serve as guidelines for
future participation,,

The authorization stated that the

United States?
10

was ideologically attached to the principle of
strengthening international organizations;

2c

b u t , it would take a more critical, restrained
look at the work of such organizations;

3o

and, it would limit, if possible, large-scale
operational responsibilities of the recipient
41
organization,,^

Let us focus upon U.S. behavior, under the above
objectives, with respect to a specialized agency of the UN„
The Special Fund is an international agency which has
depended exclusively upon voluntary contributions from
g o v e r n m e n t s I t was set up in 1959 for the purpose of
41Ibido, ppo 92-105o
^ T h e Special Fund was chosen as an example for two
reasonso First, it is funded by voluntary contributions„
The contributing countries may lend monetary assistance,
but there is no assessment involvedc Second, it is an agency
about which there was Soviet-Ameriean interaction,, The
interaction typified the effect national security policy has
on Soviet-American objectives vis-a-vis international organi
zations o
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financing preparatory and pre-investment projects in vari
ous countries to make it possible for technical assistance
and development to yield maximum results»

In keeping with

its mandate, the Fund concentrated on relatively large
projectso

The sum total of government contributions was

million in 1960 and over $$0 million by 1964c

The

United States contributed sixty per cent of the total at
first, but by 1964 had reduced its shared to thirty-seven
per c e n t o ^
Soviet Objectives
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward inter
national organizations has changed a great deal in the past
two decadeso

During the lifetime of Stalin, the UaSoS.R.

largely ignored the UN, particularly its voluntary pro
grams, or attacked them as imperialist dominated„

Cer

tainly it did not contribute to them, since the aid went
to countries which were "generally on the wrong side" of
the revolution,,

As new countries came into the UN, the

power relationship changed,,

With the ascendancy of Khrush

chev, the General Assembly became dominated by weak nations
and began to deal with problems which were merely tangen
tial to major political decisions on international affairs.
^ J o h n G 0 Stoessinger and Associates, Financing
the UN (Washington, D 0C o: The Brookings Institution,
'1964) , p. 57o
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Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders adjusted to the
new UN.

They came to accept the fact major political deci

sions are not made there.

Vietnam is a clear example of

the limitations of UN power,,

The Pakistani-Indian negoti

ations at Tashkent in 1966 illustrated again that although
Security Council resolutions may lead to nothing, comparable
decisions may be effectively arrived at outside the UN
framework„

At the same time, the large membership of the

General Assembly appears to preclude serious discussion
and negotiation of delicate issues.

However, the expendi

ture of effort by the Soviet Union since Stalin testifies
that they do not discount the UN as entirely impotent.
From the foregoing, it might be safely stated that
the Soviet Union tries to use the United Nations to advance
what it perceives to be its interests.

Alexander Dallin

makes this point quite convincingly?
Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations and
its specialized agencies have ranged from sus
picion and scorn to a desire to capitalize on
them for material, and especially, political
ends.H
Where these interests appear to include frustrating Western
policies, Soviets prove themselves accomplished at that
art.

Where these interests appear to include collabora

tion across ideological barriers, the Soviets demonstrate
^ Al exander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United
Nations (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 6S„
—
——
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a comparable capacity*

In both cases the Soviet Union has

found the United Nations an important instrument of its
foreign p olicy*^
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the UN
specialized agencies has been generally favorable*

As an

authoritative Soviet account explains:
The specialized agencies play a certain role in
the development of cooperation among the states
in the technical, scientific and other fields*
However, their role in the case of peaceful
cooperation should not be exaggerated* It is
limited by the special framework of its activity*
More than that, the essence of certain specialized
agencies is manifestly anti-democratic*^3
The U*S*S*Ro by the mid-fifties began to make small contri
butions to the specialized agencies*

When the Special Fund

was established in 1959, the Soviets joined its support
with a five per cent contribution*^^
The evidence suggests that Soviet support of the
Special Fund was not motivated primarily by chauvinistic
attitudes*

In the eyes of the recipient states, the pro

gram had become largely identified with the United States*
On a number of occasions, the Soviet delegation to the
^ ibid* , p* 45ff<.
^-6r o l * Malinin and S„ A* Bobrov, Organizatsiia
0 b fedinennykh Natsii (Leningrad, 1960), as cited in
Dallin, The Soviet Union * * * , op* cit*, p* 70*
47john G* Stoessinger, "Financing the United
Nations System," International Conciliation, DXXXVI
(Nov* 1961), 197-210*
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Special Fund objected to projects in anti-communist coun
tries like Formosa, South Korea, and South Vietnam, but
never foreed a separate vote on any one given project
In summary, the place of international organiza
tions in Soviet eyes is:
1o

to strengthen international organizations,
particularly those which will produce a
political advantage;

2*

to advocate limited expansion of large-scale
operational responsibilities by the organi
zations ;

3o

to continue a critical approach to the work
of such organizations*^

The objectives of the Americans and the Soviets
have moved to a point of convergence with regard to atti
tudes toward international organizations*

The Soviets

have gone from a position of direct ideological opposition
to international organizations to a guarded support of
them*

The Americans have moved from unconditional support
^ S t o e s s i n g e r , "Financing * . „

op* cit., p. 199»

L v o v summarizes various Soviet policy state
ments on international organization in "United Nations:
Results and Prospects," International Affairs, No* 9
(Sept* 1965)j especially p* 8ff* This list of objectives
was borrowed from Cd* Lvov’s study*
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of these entities to a rather restrained position,,

During

the period of this study* both countries contributed to
the agencies of the United Nations, but both look with
jaundiced eye upon any program which might substantially
injure the interests of each,

Triska and Finley sum

these attitudes as follows!
In a way, the United States has developed a
tendency to view the economic, social, and
cultural activities of the United Nations as
one base for its anti-communist program,, After
initial hesitation, the Soviet Union accepted
the challenge; compartmentalization into cul
tural, economic and social matters on the one
hand and political matters on the other was not
realistiCo
In a sense, the USSR came to par
ticipate in international functional organiza
tions for the same reasons Stalin had decided
to join the League and the United Nations! it
was apparently to the political interest of the
Soviet U n i o n 3 0
Consideration of Soviet-American interaction in
the Special Fund lends credence to the foregoing summary
and provides a touchstone for a discussion of the effect
national security policy has on participation in inter
national organization„

In 1960, it was recommended to the

Special Fund’s governing council that twelve UN experts
and some equipment be sent to the agricultural station at
Santiago, Cuba, to study the fields of tropical husbandry,
soil classification, conservation and crop diversification.
The proposed project was to last five years„

It called

50jo F 0 Triska and D» D„ Finley, Soviet Foreign
Policy, op. cit,, p„ 374°
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for an allocation from the Special Fund of $1 million,,
The Cubans were to contribute $2 million.51
The project came up for approval before the Govern
ing Counej_i 0f ^he Special Fund in May, 1961, a few weeks
after the disastrous Bay of Pigs confrontation,.

Needless

to say, the American attitude was not conducive to approval
of a project to aid Castro's island.

Cuba was perceived

to be a vital weakness in United States security system.
American security policy dictated that aid to Cuba would
not be in its "interest."

The American policy toward Cuba

was to oppose "any source of aid and comfort to the present
regime,”

52

a policy based clearly on security ground.

Yet,

when the Special Fund was created, it had been agreed, at
the insistence of the United States, that "political" con
siderations would play no part in the allocation of aid;
projects were to be determined according to economic cri
teria. ^3

The non-political voting record of the Fund would

have been broken had not the American President decided
that the United States would lose on a separate vote.

The

51 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Hearings on the Special Fund, Feb. 1S, 1963.
SSth Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 25ff„
———
^Statement of Richard N„ Gardner to Subcommittee
on Foreign Relations, in Hearings on-the Special Fund,
o p , cit ., p. 2,
53lbid„ » p, 2G<, The unanimity rule governing the
Fund's decision-making process had been unbroken up to con
sideration of the Cuban Project.
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Cuban project was adopted, but not before Congressional and
State Department opinion called into question the continu
ance of the large American contribution to the Fund and
other UN assistance„

One single project, representing

one-half of one per cent of total Special Fund aid, prompted
a Congressional examination and subsequent modification
of U o S 0 objectives simply because the project ran headlong
into American national security policy,, 54
The Cuban Project demonstrated that it is extremely
difficult for the United States to separate economic from
security considerations0

This condition is exemplary of

Soviet-American attitudes toward international organiza
tion,,

The chief losers are the underdeveloped countries

and those in the West who believe that strengthened inter
national bodies can do much to promote international
stability and progress„
Space Research
United States Objectives
American space efforts are a product of early mili
tary initiative in space,,

Space emerged as an area of

54According to Richard Gardner, re-examination of
U.S. participation in the Special Fund, as described in
Hearings on the Special F u n d , op0 cit», led to a twentythree per cent decrease in U 0S„ aid to the Fund.
It also
led to the fight that occurred over the UN bond issue as
discussed supra» For an expanded explanation of this point,
see R„ N„ Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order (New York:
Praeger, 1966), especially chapter 4„
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military competition with the launching of the first Sput
nik by the Soviets in October of 1957®

The military impli

cations, which were already understood by experts, suddenly
became clear to all those who were willing to see0

The

United States then turned to the task of recouping its
military position and prestige,,

In the next three years,

the United States regained its face by surpassing the number
of Soviet satellites to a significant degree„

It then

placed its space efforts under the aegis of the National
Space and Aeronautics Administration„

NASA was charged with

primary responsibility for developing

UoS„

programs for the

peaceful exploration of outer space,,

The National Aero

nautics and Space Act of 1958 declares it to be "the policy
of the United States that activities in space should be
devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man
kind
President Kennedy, in a news conference on May 9,
1962, outlined U„S„ objectives in outer s p a c e s ^
1o

to cooperate in the peaceful exploration of
outer space;

2o

to accept Russian proposals for cooperation

55UoS0, Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Space
and Aeronautics, National Aeronautics and Space Act, Hearings,
$5th Congo, 2nd Sesso, 1958, p„ 381°
^ P u b l i c Papers of the President--Kennedy, 1962,
op o cite, p 0 32o
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in unmanned exploration of the lunar sur
face, in mapping the Earth's magnetic field
and in establishing joint operational
weather satellite systems;
3o

to be first in space*

Let us see how well founded these proposals of the
President are in fact*

There are essentially three differ

ent objectives as articulated by Kennedy^ peaceful use of
space, cooperation with the Soviet Union and a prestige
factor--striving to be "first*"
Peaceo--Though the stress on peace has obvious
propaganda purposes, it does have a great deal of opera
tional significance0

Most obviously, it very strongly

reinforced the decision to place the space program under
NASA,

And, though there is cooperation between NASA and

the Defense Department, NASA has gone to considerable
lengths to avoid identification with military endeavors-withdrawing from the geodetic satellite project, for ex
ample, when the Department of Defense insisted that it be
classified as

" s e c r e t

*"57

The man-in-spaee program remains

under NASA's management despite Air Force ambitions in this
field*

And, the aura of publicity surrounding the space

program obviously emphasizes its civilian, scientific and
57po s o Greenberg, "Space Accord? NASA's Enthusi
asm for East-West Co-operation Not Shared by the Pentagon," Science, CXXXVI (April 1962), 138*
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exploratory aspects«
Cooperation*■
— -In the period under study, there have
only been two instances of Soviet-American cooperation in
space? a joint weather satellite system and a joint geo
detic mapping system*

The significance of these efforts

relative to the entire space programs of both countries is
discussed below*
Prestige*--The basis of this objective was explained
by General Curtis LeMay, former Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force?

"Maintaining peace in space, as elsewhere,

will be accomplished through

d e t e r r e n c e * ” ^

Lyndon Johnson

endorsed this theory of "peace,” though less clearly?
If peace is to be maintained on earth, free men
must acquire the competency to preserve space as
a field of peace before it can be made a new
battlefield of tyranny* * * „ If we abandon the
field, space can be pre-empted by others as an
instrument of aggression*59
And President Kennedy said, "Only if the United States occu
pies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether
this new ocean of space will be a sea of peace, or a terriZ!A

fying new theater of war*”DU

By general consent the United

5 % * S 0 , Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Ser
vices, Military Procurement Authorization for Fiscal Year
1964, Hearings, 88 th Cong*, 2nd Sess*, 19&3, p p * #96-#97.
^Congressional Record, CII (June 1$, 1963), 1*
6Qpublic Papers * * * Kennedy, 1962, o p , pit *»

p* 669o
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States must remain "first" in space in order to assure ful
fillment of the first objective--peaceful exploration,,
Soviet Objectives
E„ Korovin, writing for International Affairs
(Moscow), indicated that the Soviet Union desired to en
courage international cooperation in space and agreed to
abide by the rules of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Spaceo

6 "1

Korovin cited statements by Russian mili

tary leaders that the Soviet Union was totally committed to
formal securance of space neutralization and demilitariza
tion^2
In a letter to President Kennedy on May 31 > 1962,
Premier Khrushchev proposed a joint venture between the
United States and the Soviet Union»^3

The venture was to

include efforts tp map the earth's magnetic field and to
establish joint operational weather satellites„

Two months

later, on July 30, 1962, Khrushchev, in no uncertain terms,
stated the Soviet objective "to fly /the first/7 Russian

1

'Eo Korovin, "Peaceful Co-operation in Outer
Space," International Affairs (Moscow), XXXII (March 1962),
32„
62See statements by Marshall G 0 p 0 Zhukov in
Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, op0 cit», p„ 210„
63a summary of this letter is printed in the New
York Times, June 1, 1962, p„ 32<>
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pennant over lunar s o i l . " ^
Thus, Soviet objectives are identical to American
objectives in all respects.

Both countries strive for

peaceful cooperation in the conquest of space.

However,

the third space objective of each country, when taken to
gether, are unmistakably contradictory; both countries seek
to be "first" in space.

This objective, when viewed as a

matter of prestige, seems non-military in nature.

Each

country, quite naturally, would like to be first on the
moon.

Maintenance of pride, however, is a very thin facade.

President Kennedy readily admitted that "I do not think the
United States can afford to come in second in space, because
I think space has too many military implications."^

As

was noted in the first chapter of this study, if each
country can maintain superiority in space, it reserves the
potential to turn its advantage into a military threat.
The Soviets recognize this potential and rationalize their
efforts to conduct their space program on a unilateral
basis as follows?
The Soviet Union, which is resolutely opposed
to the utilization of outer space for military
purposes, cannot ignore all those preparations
of the American imperialists, and is forced to
safeguard its security against an attack through

6% e w York Times. July 31 , 1962, p. 17.
^ Public Papers . . . Kennedy--196 2, o p . cit.,
p. 4&5°
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outer space.
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Yet both countries agree that space should not be
the subject of competing claims; that cooperative experi
ments should be undertaken and information exchanged; and
that communications among nations should be improved,,

It

is submitted that some kinds of cooperation are virtually
imperative for the success of the United States and Soviet
programso

NASA faces a very practical need for stations

around the world for tracking space probes and receiving
telemetered data from them,,

There will be cooperative re

quirements for space laboratories and stations for the
exploration of other planets in the Solar system.
However, to date, there has been little coopera
tion between the two countries.
tracking satellite was launched.

In 1963, a joint weather
In early 1964, the

United States cooperated with the Soviet Union in a mag
netic field mapping venture.

It is of significant note

that both of these programs were terminated in 1965, when
each nation accused the other of using the systems for
military purposes.

In answer to the concern some members

of Congress displayed in reaction to these accusations,
Secretary McNamara blithely responded?
^Statement by Marshall R. Ya. Malinovsky, late
Soviet Minister of Defense, as quoted in B. Singh,
tTLaw . o .w 0£. cit. , p. 447o See also note 2 6 , pages 3031 of this paper.
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I must admit that our operations in space for
military purposes are truly quite extensive„
We have weather projects, we have mapping and
survey projects--all of these for military pur
poses,, We are working on a missile alarm system
based partially on the joint /UoS„-Soviet7
satellite operations„ „ . „ We are only in
directly receiving information from the joint
operations and only then to reaffirm the data
received from our own systems,67
The two instances of Soviet-Ameriean cooperation
seem slight efforts in view of the overwhelming similarity
in objectives„

But to have even these ventures terminated

because of a particular security need borders on incredulity„
The space environment for a long time will present
a physical, not a social challenge; knowledge acquired by
all nations will be of inestimable value to those who seek
to explore space.

The data becoming available is over

whelming, the interconnection of disciplines is too per
vasive and the skills of a nation are too dependent, for
reasonable progress, on the knowledge of the other„

Surely

it would be wiser to agree on the common use of national
facilities, which would enhance the success of space exploration0

Indeed, many argue that cooperation is a neces

sary prerogative for the achievement of peace.,66

"In the

67u „S„, Congress, House, Committee on Appropria
tions, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966,
Hearings, 89th Congo, 1st Sessl, p p a 331-332o
~
^ T h i s objective is the first of those stated by
both superpowerso
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broadest sense," says the Director of NASA’s Office of
International Programs,
we are seeking to reduce international tensions
to transmute dangerous rivalries and ambitions
into constructive communities of interest--in
Europe, Latin America and elsewhere, and to es
tablish patterns of cooperation in the world. . . .
There has been a tremendous amount of sentiment
here and abroad--and especially in the small
nations--for international co-operation in ex
ploring space in the hope that this might reduce,
rather than expand, the dimensions of the cold
w a r .69
However, as long as outer space represents a poten
tial element of national security policy, both countries
will pursue space exploration along unilateral lines.

As

President Kennedy recognized, "we are all anxious to co
operate in the peaceful exploration of space, but to do so,
of course, requires the breakdown of our nuclear barriers
of hostility and

s

e

c

r

e

c

y

.

As long as these barriers

exist, the effectiveness of reaching compatible goals of
"peaceful exploration of space” is decreased by a factor of
one-half.

69a 0 W D Frutkin, "International Co-operation in
Space Exploration," address at the 3rd National Conference
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as cited in Vernon
Van Dyke, Pride and Power (Urbanar University of Illinois
Press, 1964), p. 114.
^ P u b l i c Papers . . . Kennedy— '1962, op . cit.,
p. 769 o
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Cultural Interchange
United States Objectives
The participants of the Twenty-second American
Assembly on Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations On Oct„
21, 1962, defined cultural affairs as comprising
the broad realm of educational, intellectual,
scientific, and artistic activity. They are
an essential and integral part of international
relations, for they are concerned with contacts
between people, the exchange of ideas, and the
expression and confrontation of cultural and
social idealso71
President Kennedy, within a month after taking
office, created an Assistant Secretary of State for Educa
tional and Cultural Affairso
Febo 27, 1961, he saids

In a press statement on

” . „ „ this whole field is urgently

in need.of imaginative policy development, unification and
vigorous d i r e c t i o n H e would look to the Secretary of
State, aided by the new Assistant Secretary, ttto exercise
primary responsibility for policy guidance and program
direction of governmental activities in this field0n72
Kennedy then appealed to the educational community,
private foundations and voluntary organizations for still
greater effort, noting that °these institutions represent
7lReport of the 22nd Assembly on Cultural Affairs
and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press,
19 6 3 ) , p. 2,
72puhiic Papers » „ o Kennedy— -1961 , op>„ cit,,
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our national resource base for helping new countries educa
tionally and strengthening our cultural ties with old
ones."^
Private organizations and the academic community
quickly responded to this fresh assertion of federal leader
ship with new ideas for program improvement, a new willing
ness to cooperate, and a new burst of private effort.
Representatives of many foreign governments also made it
clear that they welcomed this new American initiative.
Trust and charitable funds were created to help finance cul
tural programs both in the United States and abroad.7^
Congress contributed to the effort by enacting the
Fulbright-Hays Act in the fall of 1961 by an overwhelming
majority.

The new law consolidated the old Fulbright and

Smith-Mundt laws and various other scattered legislative
provisions, removed a variety of major obstacles to effec
tive administration, and added several new authorities.75
73ibid., p. 19°
7^Among these institutions were the Pan-American
Fund, Asian Fund, American Friends of the Middle East,
International Market Institution and the Hamilton Fund.
These organizations are noted for reasons that will become
obvious later.
^^For an historical discussion of the legislation
on cultural matters, see American Assembly Report, o p . cit.,
pp. 153ff; and C„ Frank el", The Neglected Aspect of Foreign
Affairs (Washington, B 0C.: Brookings Institution, 1965),
pp. 132ff.

so
Co-sponsor Wayne Hays of Ohio later told the newly appointed
U.S. Advisory Commission on International and Cultural
Affairs, headed by Dr. John W. Gardner, "this law is in
tended to give all the possible authority needed to develop
the programs adequately.
ask your lawyers to look

If you don’t find what you need,
h a r d e r .

"^6

The following objectives received particular atten
tion from the Assistant Secretary’s office, working in
close cooperation with other federal agencies and numerous
private experts and organizations:
1.

to put greater emphasis on the AID program
'human resource development in Africa, Asia

on
and

Latin America as the sine qua non for social
development ;
2.

to provide new educational techniques, curricu
lum reform and more books for these areas;

3.

to improve schools for American dependents and
to strengthen American-sponsored schools in the
Middle East;

4.

to encourage the exchange of educational tele
vision programs and films, and to initiate a
"reverse flow” of foreign artistic presenta
tions to the United States;

5.

to strengthen cultural relations with specific

76jvjew York Times, Dec. 13, 1962, p. 29o
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countries such as Japan, India, Spain, Poland
and the Soviet Union,77
A new phase of U,S, national effort was begun, but
there were no miracles and a very great deal remained to
be accomplished.

Within the federal government, there were

still many inherited deficiencies of organization and per
sonnel to be overcome.

And not least important was the

problem of persuading the reluctant House Appropriations
Committee that these activities were as vital to the suc
cess of the nation1s nwell-beingrt as military expenditures,
VS
though requiring far less money,'
Soviet Objectives
The view has prevailed for many years in the Soviet
Union that art, science, and scholarship are instruments
of the State and its policies,

Soviet representatives are

explicit in saying that while they believe in peaceful co
existence between states with different social systems,
they do not believe in peaceful co-existence at the
77UoS o, Department of State, American Cultural
Goals» Bulletin No, 123, March 30, 1902,
7SC , Frankel makes this point in The Neglected
Aspect , c , , 0£, cit,, pp, 154-162, The problem of fund
ing various non-security objectives is consistently en
countered in the areas of foreign aid, aid to international
organizations, and space research. It is particularly men
tioned at this point because cultural programs have re
ceived the poorest monetary attention of any of the non
security categories.
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ideological level.
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Under the circumstances, it might

well seem that genuine Soviet intellectual exchange in
ideological areas such as the social sciences, literature
and philosophy is impossible.
Despite these ideological barriers, the Soviets
created the State Committee for Cultural Relations with
Foreign Countries in 1957» apparently for the purpose of
facilitating cultural relations with the United States and
the United Kingdom.

According to Frederick Barghoorn,

this agency operates

. . t o regularize cultural rela

tions, both with the ’bourgeois1 and ’socialist* states by
8n
means of formal treaties and agreements.”ou

However, the Soviets have persisted in an isolat
txonist situation vis-a-vis cultural interchange and have
responded slowly to the demands of other nations.

To take

some examples from the period up to 1966, a scholar re
questing permission to study contemporary Moscow dialect
was turned down on the ground that there were insufficient
facilities for conducting research.^

Another scholar,

requesting permission to study Soviet agriculture, was
79Report of the Soviet-American Citizens Conference,
Leningrad, 1964, as translated in Current Digest. on. cit..
XVI, No. 8, 22-23.
^ Frederick C. Barghoorn, ’’Soviet Cultural Effort,”
Proceedings. American Academy of Political Science, X X I X ,
N ^ 7 T T T 567T 6 9 .

—

^ New York Times, May 16, 1960, p. 21.

S3
turned down on the ground that he could find the informadp
tion he wanted by studying Mr„ Khrushchevas speeches,,
American students in the Soviet Union have encountered
restrictions on travel, difficulties in obtaining material
from archives, and occasional harassment from the police
American scholars and universities wanting to communicate
directly with Soviet scholars whom they have wished to
invite to the United States have waited unreasonably long
periods of time before receiving an answer and have not
infrequently received no answer at a l l „ ^
Last, but not least, there has remained the con
stant problem of dealing with Soviet organizations osten
sibly established to facilitate cultural exchange
Frequently, these "front1* groups turn out to be instruments
of Soviet political policy whose sole concern is to en
courage the growth of parallel organizations in the United
States serviceable to Soviet propaganda objectives„
Beyond the area of student and scholarly exchange,
York Times, Dec„ 12, 1961, p„ 1$„
^3yfew York Times, June 15, 1962, p„ 42 „
^-Frankel, Neglected Aspect „ » . , op0 cit.o,
p p 0 11S-129 o
^5See the discussion of the VOKS organization and
the SOD in Barghoorn, "Soviet Cultural Effort," ojd0 cit„
^Frederick C„ Barghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offen
sive (Princeton, N„J<,: Princeton University Press, 1960),
p. 1£9 o
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some success has been achieved„
be heard in the Soviet Union„

The Voice of America may

Tours of the United States

by groups like the Bolshoi Ballet or the Moiseyev Folk
Dancers have not only given pleasure to Americans, but
have probably helped to lessen the aura of strangeness
surrounding the Russian c i t i z e n T h e general movement of
Soviet citizens across the Russian borders has enormously
increased, and the officials in the American Embassy now
see more Russians in a week than ten years ago they saw
in a y e a r „ ^
For the purposes of this study, it could be said
that the only objective of the Soviets in cultural exchange
is a negative one; that the Russians continue to be
opposed to exchange0

However, Barghoorn suggests that this

attitude has been somewhat softened„

He submits that if

the exchange serves to advance the political "image” of the
Soviet Union, restrictions are relaxed,,

Barghoorn describes

Soviet cultural objectives, under the rubric of State
policy, as follows5
1o

to undo the harmful effects on the Soviet image

$7Frankel, Neglected Aspect » „ „ ,

ojd0

cit „ , p„ 1220

^Barghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offensive, op0 cite,
p Q 99ffo A lack of Soviet statements on cultural exchange
necessitated reliance upon such secondary material as
Barghoorn*s studies0 It should be mentioned that Barg
hoorn looks upon the Soviets with a very critical eye;
almost unjustifiably so in some instances„
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caused by the Stalinist rudeness, secrecy and
violence;
20

to disseminate the idea that Russia be regarded
as the chief world center of progress, spiri
tual cultivation, enlightenment and humanitarianism;

3»

to allow foreigners to visit the Soviet Union
to dispel the falsehoods created by the capi
talist press;
to facilitate acquisition of useful knowledge,
particularly scientific knowledge

The difference between an open and closed society
is most dramatically shown in the area of cultural inter
change o

American objectives are to expand the opportuni

ties for cultural exchange and encourage such expansion in
other countrieso

The Soviets, ostensibly, have indicated

a willingness to participate in cultural exchange,,

In

actuality, they have gone to great lengths to frustrate
exchange unless it happens to be politically expedient„
This is not to say there is no ulterior, chauvinistic
motive behind U oS 0 objectives,,

This is merely to indicate

the significant divergence between the superpowers with
regard to cultural inter change <,
g9Ibid», p p 0 335-337»
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Gultural exchange, at its best, implies free move
ment across national boundaries for the sharing of know
ledge,,

If one eould assume that the underlying objectives

of the Soviet Union were to refurbish the Russian image in
the eyes of the rest of the world, one would expect the
Soviets carefully, but surely, to open their doors.

A

cursory examination of Soviet-American exchanges indicates
that this has not been the case.

According to Open Doors--

1964, published by the Institute of International Educa
tion, out of the 53,036 foreign students in the United
States in 1963, 37 were from the Soviet Union,,

Of the 5,530

faculty members from other countries who spent a major part
of the year in the United States, 9 were Soviets.

Of the

2,427 American university members abroad, only 22 made an
extended visit to the U.SoS.R.

Seven of these were social

scientists, 9 were medical men and 5 were natural scien
tists.^^
Perhaps the greatest barrier to the freedom of cul
tural exchange results from the chauvinistic attitude of
the Russians.

The communist university, whether in Russia

or the satellite countries, is restricted to a program of
indoctrination.

It must teach the social sciences, not as

they are, but as the government of the Soviet Union desires
90jnstitute of International Education, Open Doors-1964 (New York? Columbia University Press, 1 9 6 5 ), pp. 6 - 8 0

&7

them to b e « ^

It would be fantasy to expect the Russians

to expose students to a program which is inconsistent with
that taught in Soviet schools,,
The United States is not free from this criticism,,
According to the American Assembly, it is almost impossible
to hold an international scientific convention in the
United States because of the difficulties in getting promi
nent scientists through visa and immigration barriers„
Under the present law, a scientist is almost certain to be
ineligible for a visa, both because he belongs to an organi
zation proscribed for security reasons and because he is
92
liable to advocate subversive doctrines„

Nor are these the only factors that have played a
role in impeding the realization of even the modest goals
for cultural exchange between the United States and the
Soviet Union,,

In both countries, security considerations

adversely affect free exchange of scholars„

Exchange of

information is an integral part of nuclear strategy„93

un

controlled increase in the volume of exchange would allow
9lBarghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offensive, op„ eit.,
p„ 234»
^ American Assembly Report, op „ cit,, p„ 1$9° This
condition is not far removed from Soviet control of its
educational process„
93For a discussion of the requirements for contem
porary nuclear strategy, see Henry Kissinger, The Troubled
Partnership, o p, cit0, p„ 1$9ffo
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the Soviets to penetrate the U 0S 0 security establishment„
The United States would not be able to control the precise
amount of information necessary to make the nuclear threat
credible0

Carefully controlled exchange gives the Soviets

"enough” information to make the threat credible„

Both

countries, then* must restrict population movements so
that each will receive the desired information about the
other's nuclear arsenal.

Although the Soviets claim that

it is the Americans who bar certain fields of scientific
investigation, particularly atomic research, from the ex
change program, the fact remains that the Soviets have
repeatedly nominated people to do research in the United
States in these affected area, but have used the argument
of insufficient research facilities to deny parallel re
quests by Americans .94There is another area of conflict between attain
ment of cultural objectives and security policy0

On Febo

13? 1967 si the National Student Association, largest col
lege student organization in the United States, conceded
that it had been receiving funds from the Central Intelli
gence Agency since the early 1950!s<>

The President of the

MSA reported that CIA funds had been used to help finance
the Association's international activities, including
94This point is made by Charles Frankel in "The
’Cultural Contest,’" Proceedings, Academy of Political
Science, XXIX, No. 3 (1969), 140-1$$.
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sending representatives to student congresses abroad and
funding student exchange programs,95

On F e b » 17, the

New York Times published a list of other organizations that
were receiving CIA funds,

The list included:

International

Student Conference, Leyden, Netherlands; the U,S, Youth
Council of New York; the World Assembly of Youth in Brus
sels; The Pan American Fund; The Asia Foundation; American
Friends of the Middle East; International Market Institute;
96
and The Independent Research Service of New York0
These revelations prompted demonstrations and com
ments from the academic communities all over the world.

As

a Vassar sociology professor phrased it, ,T/the CIA~f under
mines the official goals of American foreign policy” and
has ’’subverted the independence of some research in major
universities in the United States to the point where no
American scholar can now be above suspicion when he goes
a b r o a d ,” 97

An example of foreign reaction to these activities
occurred a year later.

The Asia Foundation, a private

philanthropic organization, had been carrying out its oper
ations in 14 countries between Afghanistan and Japan to
■ 95jjew

YorkTimes, Feb, 13 > 1967? p. 1*

9&tlew York Times, Feb, 17* 1967, p. 36,
97tJew York Times, Feb, 13, 1967, p» 7°
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promote cultural projects in these various countries0

The

Foundation had spent nearly $1 million in India and was
considering thirty proposals for new projects totaling
$400,000c9^

On F e b „ 15* 1963, the Foundation was ordered

to "wind up" its programs and leave India as a result of
its acknowledgment that it had accepted CIA funds„

The

Indian authorities even refused to issue new import
licenses to the Foundation for books it distributed to
Indian libraries and universities<>99
The reported CIA rationale was that it felt a
responsibility to counteract Soviet infiltration of student
organizations throughout the world„

If one were willing

to accept the CIA statement that the Soviets, too, through
their Central Security agency, were infiltrating cultural
exchange programs, there can be no doubt that the two
countries are creating such an aura of suspicion in an in
herently innocent program as to render it relatively use
less,,
9% e w York Times» Feb„ 1 6 , 1963, p B 9°
99ibido

CONCLUSION
The various national security objectives of SovietAmerican foreign policy I have formulated above conflict
in obvious ways with the attainment of stated non-security
objectives of the two nations,,

The chief problem within

the Soviet-American foreign policy style is what I would
s

call its dualism, a deep fracture between two ways of deal
ing with international issues«, This, in turn, leads to
other sets of problems <>
The greatest manifestation of this dualism is a
tendency to speak two -different languages, neither of which
is entirely convincing and which are impossible to reconcile„
The first is the language of power»

Here, superpower

elites warn each other that failure to desist from hostile
acts will be met with the full weight of national might„
The second is the language of community and harmony„
Leaders of both countries protest their sincere dislike of
imperialism; they stress that they are disinterested
nations which act out of necessity and responsibility, not
selfishness; they explain that power is a tragic necessity
but that peace, love, reason, bread, and friendship for all
are the primary objectives0
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Of course, only a symbolic eagle can hold both the
arrows and the olive branch easily at the same time..

When

Russia accuses the United States of playing a classical
game of power politics, she protests, pointing to her com
munity ideals and aspirations for brotherhood; and the
Americans find the use by other nations of traditional
power plays to be nefarious and intolerable when they are
her foes; disruptive and anachronistic when they are her
friends*
Then, too, a kind of double standard afflicts each
of these languages*

In essence, both the language of

security and the language of harmony are universal; they can
be used by whoever wants to act in the world arena, yet
Americans and Russians seem to ask for special treatment*
Thus when either speaks the language of force, it does not
quite avoid implying that although it recognizes power as
a universal commodity and the necessary means for all
nations to maintain security its power is somehow morally
superior and deserves a privileged position; that it can
trust itself but no others; and that others can trust it,
but nobody else*

The American objective of peaceful co

operation in space leaves room for various more or less
convincing rationalizations of why she should be allowed
to maintain superiority in the space race*
There is the same double standard in talk about
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community.,

Americans stress reasonableness, the need to

subordinate separate interests to the higher common goodBut, at the same time, they suggest that their very dis
interestedness thrusts upon them the task of being the
trustee of the common good; they are the only people who
see the whole picture and want nothing for themselves„
Each of the superpowers, in defining the common good, sees
to it that its peculiar geographical position or its posi
tion as the most powerful nation on earth is taken into
account (for instance, limited war policy in Vietnam just
happens to correspond with the possibility, enjoyed only
by a superpower situated on a different continent, of
waging war while keeping the home territory a sanctuary)„
The contradictions in this dualism require explana
tion.,

No light is to be shed on them by talking about

hypocrisyo

A hypocrite is a man who deceitfully pretends

that he is what he is not.,

Diplomats and scholars who come

from a tradition of Machiavellian calculations tend to
interpret all diplomacies in this way, and to see in double
standards nothing but a shield behind which it is polite,
profitable and practical to advance„

But things here are

not so simple; the conflicts I have described in the pre
ceding chapters do not seem to come from pretenses„

They

come from the simple fact that the nation's value (and
leaders) point simultaneously in different directions,,
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There is, in the Soviet-American foreign policy
structure, a tension between an instinct of violence and
the drive for harmony„

The United States, for example, is

a nation intolerant of a conflict of ends.,

When Americans

are faced with a fundamental conflict of ends, their ex
perience has been to resort to force--considered the most
decisive of all ways to end such conflicts„

In using

force, they have sought not just the infliction of pain on
the enemy, which Sehelling sees as part of the bargaining
process, but the elimination of the conflict through simple
elimination of the foe0

Whenever conflicts of purposes

reappear, or when segments of the population feel
threatened, the tendency to revert to force reasserts
itself„
We thus are caught in a vicious circle„

The use

of force, as we have seen, suffices to corrupt or destroy
national objectives or to drive them underground.,

Central

Intelligence operators are not the best agents of good
neighborly relations; napalm is not the surest agent of a
dream of "and end to war „ „ „ a world where all are fed
and charged with h o p e T h e
words dazzle and vanish.,

sword swishes and cuts; the

The security effort leaves its

^Lyndon
Johnson, speech at Johns Hopkins Univer
sity, April 1965s, quoted in Marvin Gettleman (ed0), Viet
nam (Grennwich, Conn.,: Fawcett, 1965), p« 329 =
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mark, even if the result is not politically effective„

The

real concentration of energies against real or imaginary
foes acts to divert nations from establishing harmony,.
And there is another, most important difficulty"
when force plays a pre-eminent role in international rela
tions, to the extent of usurping other national goals, it
tends to increase the insecurity of that nation,,

The fate

of Hitler®s Third Reich, and the consequences of certain
steps in Soviet policy under Stalin illustrate this kind
of inverse law about national security„
These criticisms will undoubtedly elicit from the
reader the query? if all this is true, how have the two
superpowers managed to survive?
two answers.

To this question, I have

First, my purpose was not to deny the co

existence but to describe the peculiarities that mar or
|

limit ito

To borrow a nice metaphor from Andre Gide, I

was concerned with the lion's fleas, not with denying there
is a lion under the fleas„

Second, and more important,

the United States and the Soviet Union are entering into a
period in which these flaws are more of an obstacle than
they were in the paste

The use of force, when it manifests

itself, ultimately, in weapons of mass destruction, cannot
in any way serve the purposes of a constructive and viable
foreign policy,.

The pre-eminence of security policy, as it

exists in a nuclear age, can serve only to paralyze national
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policy, to undermine cooperative efforts, and to drive
everyone closer and closer to the brink of destruction,,
Theodore Draper has written that, in the Dominican crisis,
the United States policy was marked "by such bungling and
blundering that only the strongest power in the world can
afford them0ir

The question i s t

this power afford?

how much bungling can

If the lion cannot afford it, it must

bite its fleas,,
^Theodore Draper, l,The Dominican Crisis,11 Commen
tary, XX (Dec. 1965)s 61 o
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